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INTRODUCTION

The United States Constitution vests in Congress the power to
enact laws that control which aliens may enter the United States.1
The power to determine the aliens who could enter has been extended to include the power to enact laws that control the classes
of aliens already in the United States that should be deported.2
* Assistant Professor, Director of the Immigration Clinic and Trial Practice
Program, George Washington University National Law Center. J.D. 1979,
George Washington University National Law Center; B.A. Urban Economics
1975, Loyola University of Los Angeles.
1. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522
(1954).
2. See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 529-32 (1954).
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Congressional power to determine immigration policy can be
analogized to a homeowner and a passerby. If the passerby, or
alien, wishes to enter the private dwelling of the homeowner, or
the United States, she may legally do so only at the express invitation of the homeowner. The homeowner need not explain why
she refuses to allow a person into her home.'
Since the Supreme Court decisions in The Chinese Exclusion
Case4 and Nishimura Ekiu v. United States,5 scholars, albeit
with a great deal of criticism," and the judiciary7 have accepted
the proposition that Congress has plenary power in matters of exclusion. The absolutist position that the excluded alien has no
rights continues to go unquestioned in the courts. Through a
careful analysis of the Supreme Court's principal assumption in
Nishimura,8 one scholar has questioned recently the plenary nature of Congress' exclusionary power." The scholar challenged the
Nishimura maxim that every sovereign nation has the power to
admit aliens on whatever conditions it wishes as being without

3. Similarly, Congress could, under accepted legal doctrine, exclude blacks
and other racial minorities. In fact, Congress, in the past, has targeted specific
minority groups for exclusion. The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 94
(1903); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 585 (1889).
4. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
5. 142 U.S. 651 (1892). In Nishimura the Supreme Court stated:
It is an accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation
has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit
them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to
prescribe.
Id. at 659.
6. See Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1296-97
(1975) (suggesting that if the cases recognizing congressional power to exclude
were decided today, they might be decided quite differently); Gordon, The Alien
and the Constitution, 9 CAL. W.L. REv. 1, 23-24 (1972); see also Hart, The Power
of Congress to Limit the Jurisdictionof FederalCourts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1392-96 (1953); Martin, Due Process and Membership in the National Community: Political Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. PiTT. L.
REV. 165, 173-80 (1983).
7. Every judicial opinion since 1953 that has confronted this proposition has
agreed with it. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); Galvan v.
Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
8. 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
9. See Nafziger, The General Admission of Aliens Under InternationalLaw,
77 AM. J. INT'L L. 804, 823-29 (1983).
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historical or international legal precedent.1°
This Article will build upon the stable foundation presented in
the arguments that challenged, the Nishimura maxim, and will
discuss major flaws in the practice of indefinitely detaining excludable aliens in the context of the Cubans who have been detained in various parts of the United States since their arrival in
1980. First, the Article focuses on the practical merits of the use
of indefinite detention as a means of immigration policy. The Article concludes that the practice, which is extremely expensive,
does not appear to limit mass migrations, and offers, at best, only
a few benefits. Second, the Article examines the relationship between the indefinite detention of aliens by the United States and
the statutory scheme of United States immigration laws, and it
concludes that indefinite detention has no place within the
United States scheme. The Article then explores the relationship
between the indefinite detention of aliens and international law
and finds that indefinite detention violates numerous international legal principles. Last, the Article proposes solutions to the
perplexing dilemma of the indefinite detention of Cubans in the
United States.

I.

THE SOURCE OF THE PROBLEM
A.

The Facts

In April 1980 approximately 10,000 Cubans sought refuge in,
and ultimately took over, the Peruvian Embassy in Havana,
Cuba. Soon after the takeover, Prime Minister Fidel Castro
presented the United States with a dilemma of unequaled proportions when he advised those Cuban citizens who had participated
in the takeover of the Peruvian Embassy and anyone else who
merely wished to leave Cuba to prepare themselves for travel to
the United States. The United States Government, unprepared
for the consequences, responded that it would welcome the refugees. 1 The "Freedom Flotilla" eventually deposited approxi13
mately 117,000 Cubans seeking refuge 2 on United States shores.
10. See id. at 829-41.
11. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1980, at 1, col. 6; N.Y. Times, May 6, 1980, at 1,
col. 1.
12. Information on the number of refugees coming to the United States during the Freedom Flotilla has been imprecise. The numbers ranged from approximately 117,000 to 130,000. A congressional report used 116,978 as the official
figure. See H.R. REP. No. 1218, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
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Most of the refugees arrived with little more than the clothes
Courts have used 125,000. See, e.g., AlonsoMartinez v. Meissner, 697 F.2d 1160, 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Palma v. Verdeyen,
676 F.2d 100, 101 (4th Cir. 1982); Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d
1382, 1384 (10th Cir. 1981). The cases and reports do not identify the sources
used to determine the number of Cubans that arrived in the Freedom Flotilla.
13. A review of newspaper accounts provides the following chronology of
events in the Cubans' mass exodus:
(1) In January or February of 1980, several Cubans seeking refuge at the Peruvian Embassy in Havana entered the grounds of the embassy and refused to
leave. Negotiations between the Peruvian and Cuban governments regarding the
rights of the Cuban asylum seekers began. N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1980, at 1, col. 3.
(2) After attempting to persuade its citizens who had entered the embassy to
leave, the Cuban Government announced that "it would no longer grant safe
conduct [passes] to the 'antisocial elements' who wished to leave the country."
The Government also stated that it would no longer post guards around the
Peruvian Embassy nor try to prevent citizens wishing to leave from seeking refuge there. N.Y. Times, Apr. 5, 1980, at 2, col. 4.
(3) Upon learning of the Peruvian Embassy incident, Cuban-Americans began
rallying in support of the Cuban citizens at the Embassy. N.Y. Times, Apr. 20,
1980, at 20, col. 1.
(4) The United States and its allies in Western Europe and Latin America
began working on the orderly admission of refugees from the Peruvian Embassy.
N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1980, at 1, col. 6; N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1980, at 4, col. 2;
N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1980, at 2, col. 3.
(5) During the United States-Cuba negotiations, editorials in this country
urged President Carter to grant asylum to all the Cubans in the Peruvian Embassy. See, e.g., Hovey, No Threat to Castro's Rule Seen in Embassy Rush,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1980, at 11, col. 1. Candidate Ronald Reagan urged the
President to act to assist the Cubans at the embassy. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 10,
1980, at 3, col. 1.
(6) After allowing a number of refugee flights to Costa Rica, Cuba halted further transports to interim sites, demanding that the refugees be sent directly to
the countries where they will settle. N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1980, at 6, col. 1.
(7) Reports appeared of Cubans exiled in the United States rescuing forty
refugees with the approval of the Cuban Government. The United States Government acknowledged the rescue, but did not approve. See N.Y. Times, Apr.
22, 1980, at 7, col. 1.
(8) Castro challenged the United States to accept all the refugees and began
issuing travel documents even to those not at the Peruvian Embassy. N.Y.
Times, Apr. 24, 1980, at 1, col. 2. At the same time, the United States warned its
citizens that the act of bringing in aliens would subject them to criminal prosecution and seizure of their boats. Id. Notwithstanding these warnings, American
citizens travelled to Cuba to transport refugees to the United States. Id. at 15,
col. 1.
(9) Governor Bob Graham of Florida urged the United States Government to
rescind its policy of levying fines and criminal prosecutions against United
States citizens bringing refugees back from Cuba. N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1980, at
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3810, 3812.
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on their backs. Although most of the refugees truly wished to flee
communist Cuba, 14 upon their arrival in the United States they
found that they generally were not welcome. Unlike earlier refugees, first generation Cubans already residing in the United
States regarded the Freedom Flotilla refugees as criminals, bums
and antisocials. 15
Most of the approximately 117,000 Cubans who reached the
United States were initially placed in detention facilities until
sponsors could be found.16 Most of the refugees appear to have
been placed with sponsors by August 1980 when only 14,201 remained in detention. 17 By June 1982 between 1,30018 and 1,80019

11, col. 1.

(10) President Carter, in a speech before the League of Women Voters, stated
that the United States would "provide an open heart and open arms" for the
refugees. N.Y. Times, May 6, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
With this last development, the boatlift proceeded and expanded until approximately 120,000 Cubans seeking asylum had arrived on United States
shores. See supra note 12. For a general discussion of the events leading up to,
and including the handling of, the boatlift, see Copeland, The Cuban Boatlift of
1980: Strategies in Crisis Management, 467 ANNALS 138, 142-48 (1983).
14. This conclusion is based on the author's conversations with approximately 60 to 70 detainees. See also Scanlan, Regulating Refugee Flow: Legal
Alternatives and Obligations Under the Refugee Act of 1980, 56 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 618, 627 (1981).
15. Numerous articles have been written about the Cubans who came to the
United States in the Freedom Flotilla. The first articles were mostly sympathetic to the refugees. See, e.g., Thomas, Reporter'sNotebook: A Symbol of Anger and Hope in Havana, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1980, at 1, col. 5. The articles,
however, soon began to take on a negative tone. See, e.g., Thomas, Behind
Barred Doors in Havana, Would-be Emigres Wait in Fear,N.Y. Times, May 2,
1980, at 1, col. 2; see also N.Y. Times, May 18, 1980, at 1, col. 3; N.Y. Times,
May 3, 1980, at 1, col. 6. The reason for the change in tone is unclear, but several factors may have been involved. The initial general sympathy toward the
refugees led to a great deal of disappointment when Cubans exiled in the United
States returned to Cuba seeking family members and were unable to secure
their release. The exiles, however, were allowed to return with some family
members on these trips. Also, the public perception developed that many of the
Cubans who managed to escape were hardened criminals and mental patients.
No empirical proof exists to indicate that hordes of criminals and mental patients were sent to the United States. For additional discussions of the public
perception of the members of the Freedom Flotilla, see Nichols, Castro's Revenge, WASH. MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 38-42; Lang, Castro's "Crime Bomb" Inside the U.S., U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Jan. 16, 1984, at 27.
16. See infra note 36.
17. N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1980, at 9, col. 1; see infra note 20.
18. Detention of Aliens in Bureau of Prison Facilities:HearingsBefore the
Subcom. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 223 (1982).
19. What Became of the Cubans?, NEwswEEK, Feb. 1, 1982, at 28.
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refugees remained in detention. 20 These Cubans are being detained, not for criminal acts committed in the United States, but
because of their legal inadmissibility into the United States.
B. Immigration Law
The labels that attach to an alien who has presented herself at
a United States border seeking to enter the United States legally
determine the rights and protections she will be afforded during
the immigration process. First, whether the alien can prevail in
the process of gaining legal "entry" into the United States will
determine her treatment by the United States Government. If an
alien manages to gain entry into the United States, she is thereafter afforded the due process protection that the Constitution
gives to all United States citizens, even if the Government subsequently detains or attempts to deport her.21 An alien who is refused entry, however, is excluded or excludable,22 and before a
20. The task of counting Cubans in detention centers is difficult for two reasons. First, a detention center is a transitory home for a Cuban, who may never
have had a sponsor or who may have experienced a breakdown in the sponsor
relationship. See infra note 36. A Cuban in detention may be released to another sponsor in a very short period of time. Accordingly, the constant flow of
people in and out of detention centers, from sponsors to detention centers, and
from halfway houses to detention centers makes arriving at a steady number
very difficult. Second, many Cubans are transferred between detention centers.
Any fix on the number of Cubans at one detention center will quickly become
inaccurate because of the constant flow of detainees.
21. Even though deportation is not a criminal proceeding, the alien is entitled to due process. As the Court stated in The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189
U.S. 86 (1903):
[T]his Court has never held, nor must we now be understood as holding,
that administrative officers, when executing the provisions of a statute involving the liberty of persons, may disregard the fundamental principles
that inhere in "due process of law" as understood at the time of the adoption of the Constitution ....

Therefore, it is not competent for ...

any

executive officer ... to cause an alien who has entered the country, and
has become subject in all respects to its jurisdiction, and a part of its population, although alleged to be illegally here, to be taken into custody and
deported without giving him all opportunity to be heard....
Id. at 100-01 (emphasis added).
22. General classes of excludable aliens are provided by statute. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182 (1982). An alien who arrives in a United States port cannot be excluded
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determination is made regarding her status, she is termed an
"alien in exclusion." Aliens who have presented themselves, but
who have yet to be admitted or excluded, have not "entered" the
United States. 23 Aliens who legally have not "entered" the United
States are not afforded constitutional protections and can rely
only on the protections and rights that Congress has afforded
them in exclusion statutes.2 4 Aliens who have been arrested, aecused, or tried in the United States for violations of criminal statutes, however, are entitled to full constitutional rights in their
trial and detention.2 5 The Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) 26 provides for denial of admission to aliens who lack visas
or other necessary documentation, 7 who have a record of prior
criminal acts,28 or who fail to meet health, economic, or numerous
other criteria.29
Second, the Refugee Act of 1980o states that aliens may apply
upon initial examination even when the immigration officer has determined that

the alien is excludable. The alien is detained until a special hearing is held to
determine whether the alien will be excluded and deported from the United
States. See F. AUERBACH, IMMIGRATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 358-59
(1961).
23. See 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW & PROCEDURE §
1.32 (1984). The use of the word "deported" is not intended to cause confusion
between the terms exclusion and deportation. The INA uses the word "deportation" to describe the removal of aliens irrespective of whether it is a result of a
deportation or exclusion hearing. The term "deportation" has been the subject
of some confusion. See Deportationand Exclusion: A Continuing Dialogue Between Congress and the Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 760, 761 n.8 (1962).
24. Id. An alien who is a returning lawful permanent resident has greater
rights than those of the typical alien. The rights accorded to returning aliens are.
still undetermined. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982).
25. Wong Wing Hang v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896); United
States v. Henry, 604 F.2d 908, 913 (5th Cir. 1979). Similarly, aliens can sue or be
sued in civil actions and receive all of the protections afforded to United States
citizens.
26. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1982).
27. Id. § 1182(a)(18), (20), (21). The United Nations, however, acknowledges
that refugees do not always have proper papers for entry into their first country

of refuge. See

UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK

(1979) [hereinafter cited as UNHCR HANDBOOK]; see also Zamara v. INS, 534 F.2d 1055 (2nd
Cir. 1976).
28. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9), (10), (23) (1982).
29. See id. § 1182(a)(1)-(28).
30. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 22 U.S.C.).
ON PROCEDURE AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS
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for entry into the United States under "refugee" or "asylum" status. The major difference between the two categories is the location at which the alien may apply for a status. For refugee status,
the alien must apply at designated places outside the United
States border. For asylum status, the alien may apply either at a
United States border or within the United States.3 ' Both categories require that the alien establish a "well-founded fear of persecution" in her country of citizenship.3 2 If the Immigration and
Nationalization Services (INS) determines that an asylum applicant has established the requisite fear, it may confer asylum status on the applicant.3 3 In refugee cases, the INS must then ascertain that the alien is also one of the persons of "special
humanitarian concern to the United States. 3 4 If the INS grants
the alien asylum status or refugee status, the alien has legally entered the United States. One year after legal entry, the alien may
apply for3 5 an adjustment of her status to lawful permanent
residence.
Third, the INS must care for or keep track of aliens who have
not had an exclusion hearing or who have been denied legal entry
into the United States after an exclusion hearing. Of course, the
ultimate goal of the INS is to deport all aliens ordered excluded.
Until the excluded aliens can be deported, however, they, and all
other aliens who have not legally entered the United States, are
maintained by the INS through one of two methods: "detention"
or "parole." Detention is tantamount to incarceration and from
the alien's point of view, is less preferable than parole and its
relative freedom. Parole is the legal fiction whereby the alien is

31. "[A]n alien physically present in the United States or at a land border or
port of entry ... [may] apply for asylum." 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982).
32. See id. § 1101(a)(42)(A)-(B) (refugee status); id. § 1158(a) (asylum

status).
33. The INS has refused to grant asylum when an alien has gained entry or
arrived on United States shores through suspect means. See In re Salim, 18 I. &
N. Dec. 311 (1982). If the asylum applicant has established the requisite fear but

is refused asylum, the INS will not deport her until it is safe for her to return to
her country. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982).
34. National Security Directive No. 93, in U.S. DEP'T
WORLDWIDE GUIDELINES FOR OVERSEAS REFUGEE PROCESSING

OF JUSTcE, LN.S.,
24-25 (1983).

35. See 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a) (refugee status); id. § 1159(b) (asylum status).
The number of refugees that may be admitted into the United States annually is
limited by the Executive after consultation with Congress. Id. § 1157(a). Similarly, only 5,000 persons given asylum may be granted permanent residency in
the United States annually. Id. § 1159(b).

1984]

RETHINKING EXCLUSION

deemed to remain at a United States border or port of entry, even
though she is physically at liberty within the country. An applicant or excluded alien may be paroled if she posts bond, provides
sufficient assurance that she will appear as required by the INS or
happens to have a sponsorship arranged for her. A sponsor is an
individual or organization that assumes responsibility for the
well-being of the alien.36 Most Cubans who remain in detention
are either ineligible for any type of sponsorship or are eligible
only for approved sponsoring programs that are unavailable. Only
aliens who are to "enter" the United States or who were excluded
previously are paroled or detained. The alien assigned "parole"
status or detained upon arrival has no right to constitutional protections. In addition the Refugee Act discourages the use of parole as a substitute method for allowing a refugee to legally enter
37
the United States.

C. The Application of Immigration Law to Cuban Refugees
The Cuban refugees who arrived in the United States on the
Freedom Flotilla lacked visas and, thus, were detained for a period of time. Most of the refugees were later released to sponsors.
In many instances, INS' sole reason for denying Cuban aliens admission to the United States has been their lack of visas, even
though it is generally understood that refugees do not always
have the proper papers for entry into their first country of refuge.38 Some Cuban refugees continue to be detained because
36. 8 C.F.R. § 207.2(d) (1984). The term "sponsorship" is generally used for
refugees but not for asylum applicants. An organization often may receive financial reimbursement from the federal government for costs associated with taking
care of the alien. No clear guidelines or regulations describe the criteria the INS
uses to determine whether an individual or organization is eligible as a sponsor
for a detainee.
An individual interested in sponsoring an alien generally must submit documentation that demonstrates an ability to take care of the person. For example,
the sponsor should be able to assist the alien in obtaining employment, finding
housing, and enrolling in school. Affidavits of support for the alien that have
been signed by the sponsors, however, probably are not enforceable by the government or the alien.
37. "The Attorney General may not parole ... an alien who is a refugee
unless the Attorney General determined that compelling reasons in the public
interest with respect to that particular alien require that the alien be paroled
...
rather than be admitted as a refugee ....
" 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(B)
(1982).
38. See supra note 27. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1983
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sponsors cannot be found for them.39 Others remain in detention
because government officials believe that the refugees might pose
a threat to the public.40 Still others are being held in "psychological" facilities even though they have not necessarily met the normal commitment standards applicable to aliens who legally entered the United States. 4 1 The primary legal problem common to
all the Cuban refugees is that they arrived in the United States
without proper documentation. The United States Government,
to deport the Cuban refugees who were orhowever, was unable
42
dered excluded.

In a subsequent agreement with Cuba, the United States
agreed to return some refugees who had arrived in the Freedom
Flotilla.43 The refugees who are to be returned to Cuba are named
in a list on file with the Department of State, but not all Cuban
refugees currently held in detention are on the list.44 It is unlikely
would provide for the legalization of Cuban refugees who are excludable only
because of their lack of proper entry papers. The version of the bill passed by
the Senate grants the Attorney General the discretion to waive grounds of excludability "for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public interest." S. 529, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 245A(c)(2), 129
CONG. REc. 6983 (1983). A lawsuit has been filed seeking an adjustment to permanent residency status for the members of the Freedom Flotilla. See Puig v.
Nelson, No. 84-0838 (S.D. Ga. filed Apr. 5, 1984); see also MarielitosFile Class
Action for 1966 Adjustment Act Benefits, 61 INTERPRETER RELEASES 294 (1984).
39. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
40. See Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 567 F. Supp. 1115 (N.D. Ga. 1983), rev'd,
734 F.2d 576 (11th Cir. 1984).
41. See Banos v. Crosland, No. 80-2677 (D.D.C. Dec. 11, 1980). See infra
note 82.
42. See Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1384 (10th Cir.
1981); see also Nazario, Cubans Jailed in U.S. Start a Fight, Wall St. J., Jan.
21, 1983, at 17, col. 3.
43. The United States agreed to return 2,746 unnamed Cuban refugees in
accordance with an agreement dated December 14, 1984.
44. Michael H. Armacost, Under Secretary of State, in an affidavit to the
Supreme Court stated that the list is made up of persons "[w]ho are ineligible
for legal entry into the United States under United States immigration law due
to the commission of serious crimes in Cuba, the commission of serious crimes
in the United States, or severe mental disorders." The above description by its
wording alone excludes many Cuban refugees who are in detention with minor
psychological crimes or for the commission of non-serious offenses.
Neither the State Department nor the INS has given an official explanation
for the names selected for inclusion on the list. An unofficial source at one INS!
PHS evaluation facility indicated that approximately 80% of the Cuban refugees in the center were on the list.
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that the Cubans who are not on the list will be eligible to obtain
detention-free status. The United States Government earlier announced that it would allow Cuban refugees who had arrived in
the Freedom Flotilla to apply for adjustment of their status to
lawful permanent residence pursuant to the Cuban Adjustment
Act of 1966.' 5 The Central Office of the INS subsequently issued a
telegram to local INS offices stating that detained Cuban refugees
would not be eligible for an adjustment of status.46 Furthermore,
the INS could conclude from a review of the Cuban Adjustment
Act that the Act provides a basis for its denial of a status adjustment to the Cuban refugees because they lack parole status. 7
The end result is that Cuban refugees currently in detention face
the possibility of being kept there for the rest of their lives. Serious legal questions challenge the authority of the United States
or any country to hold refugees in detention for the mere civil
4
infraction of "illegal immigration.'
The problems faced by Cubans who arrived in the Freedom
Flotilla of 1980 were very different from the problems of Indochinese and other groups who previously sought refuge in the
United States. In the past, the United States Government has always provided refugees permanent residency within a short period following their arrival. 4 9 The Cubans reasonably expected to
45. See 49 Fed. Reg. 46, 212 (Nov. 23, 1984). The Cuban Adjustment Act,
P.L. 89-732, § 1 provides in part: "[T]he status of any alien who is a native or
citizen of Cuba and who has been inspected and admitted or paroled into the
United States ... and has been physically present in the United States for at
least two years, may be adjusted [to permanent residence]." (emphasis
supplied).
46. This possibility was confirmed in a recent article which appeared in a
Miami newspaper which noted that 150 of the approximately 1,600 Cubans at
the Atlanta Penitentiary are not on the deportation list but nevertheless will be
detained indefinitely. See Grimm, Mariel Refugees Guilty of Crime Now Face
Prison or Deportation,Miami Herald, Feb. 28, 1985.
47. See infra note 49.
48. See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
49. The Indochinese mass migration refugees were granted lawful permanent
residency through the Indochina Refugee Adjustment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No.
95-145, 91 Stat. 1223 (repealed 1980). The Cubans who came to the United
States when Fidel Castro assumed power were quickly granted lawful permanent
residency through the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80
Stat. 1161 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1982)). For a comparison of
the treatment of Cuban and Indochinese refugees, see Note, A Comparative
Overview of the Vietnamese and Cuban Refugee Crises: Did the Refugee Act of
1980 Change Anything?, 6 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 25, 39-45, 49-57 (1982). Ad-
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be treated, at a minimum, as refugees under the Refugee Act.50

The United States use of indefinite detention to solve the problem of the mass Cuban migration into the United States, however, is clearly unprecedented. Prior to 1954 United States immigration officials used detention as a means of preventing the entry
of "undesirable" aliens into the United States. After 1954 the
INS rarely placed excludable aliens in detention,51 unless the INS
decided to temporarily hold the alien pending her deportation or
to facilitate her transition into United States society. Aliens have
always been detained when the purpose was to conduct a speedy
exclusion hearing and to facilitate deportation. Excludable aliens,
however, have never been held for as long as some of the presently detained members of the Freedom Flotilla.5 2 A review of
available information reveals no recorded cases involving indefinite detention prior to the Freedom Flotilla of 1980. 53
A change in the INS nondetention policy appears to have been
made during 1980. 54 The INS apparently wds motivated .to make

mission and permanent residency were granted to the displaced persons of

World War II, Hungarians following the revolt of 1956 and countless other
groups. See, e.g., Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-509, 72 Stat. 419; Act of
Aug. 7, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-203, 67 Stat. 400; Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No.
80-774, 62 Stat. 1009.
50. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
51. See Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958); 1A C. GORDON & H.
ROSENFIELD, supra note 23, § 3.17c. In deportation cases, the imposition of detention is accompanied by setting bond. Payment of the bond will release the
alien. In exclusion cases, the alien usually is paroled into the United States to
allow the INS to complete the inspection process at a later date and place. Detention is rarely used. Clearly, the detention of all excludable aliens or those
aliens who have not completed the inspection process would be expensive and
impractical. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
52. For example, in Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206
(1953), the petitioner had only been held for twenty-one months. The Cubans'
confinement has lasted for almost five years.
53. This conclusion was reached based upon a review of reported exclusion
cases.
54. Although it is difficult to determine the exact date when the policy shift
occurred, a review of cases and practice shows an increase in the use of detention in 1980. See cases cited infra note 55. On June 26, 1981, the Office of the
United States Attorney General issued a memorandum recommending mass detention and interdiction to resolve the "Cuban/Haitian problem." See Detention
of Aliens in Bureau of Prison Facilities: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary,97th Cong., 2d Sess. 223-29 (1982) (memorandum from Subcomm. Chair Robert W. Kastenmeier to Subcomm. members). The interdiction
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the policy shift because of its concern that the nondetention policy encouraged migration falling outside the regulatory scheme of
the Refugee Act. The INS apparently thought that the notorious
use of detention would deter aliens from choosing the United
States as a place of refuge. Strong evidence, however, supports
the conclusion that the detention policy was specifically reinstituted to discourage nonwhite immigration 5 Notwithstanding
INS insistence that its detention policy is colorblind, detention is
6
still the norm when Cuban and Haitian aliens are in exclusion. 1
Whether the increased use of detention has accomplished the
proffered policy objective of discouraging illegal immigration remains unclear.57 Under a policy of indefinite detention, however,
the members of the Freedom Flotilla who have been paroled face
the ominous and ironic prospect of being returned to detention at
any time and remaining there with no possibility of release. The
use of detention raises an important question of its legality when
the United States Government is unable to execute the deportation of the excludable Cubans and when no other country will
accept them.5

policy was instituted in September 1981. See Exec. Order No. 12, 324, 46 FED.
REG. 48,109 (1981). The detention policy guidelines were issued by the Attorney
General on Apr. 16, 1982. See Detention Policy Guidelines in Exclusion Cases,
59 INTERPRETER RELEASES 349 (1982). Except for the Cubans and Haitians, few
cases of long term detention for excludable aliens exist, notwithstanding the asserted change in policy.
55. See Vigile v. Sava, 535 F. Supp. 1002, 1016-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Bertrand
v. Sava, 535 F. Supp. 1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd, 684 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1982);
Stepick, HaitianBoat People: A Study in the Conflicting Forces Shaping U.S.
Policy, 45 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173 (1982); Comment, The Discrimination
Against HaitianAliens Seeking Asylum in the United States, 13 CuMs. L. REV.
593 (1982-83); Comment, Jean v. Nelson: A Stark Pattern of Discrimination,36
U. MIAMI L. REV. 1005, 1024-28 (1982).
56. The detention of Haitians has diminished, but the decrease may be a
result of the policy of interdiction (boarding vessels while they are still in international waters). See Exec. Order No. 12,324, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,109 (1981).
57. A.C.L.U., SALVADORANS IN THE UNITED STATES: THE CASE FOR EXTENDED
VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE 55 (1983). The massive influx of Salvadorans into the

United States is an example of a situation in which refugees will continue to
seek refuge in the United States no matter how oppressive the entry requirements might be. Salvadoran refugees probably reasoned that detention in a safe
country would be better than the possibility of death in their own country.
58. This Article will not discuss the problems confronting Haitian refugees
seeking asylum in the United States. The Haitians are not subject to indefinite
detention because if they are excluded, the Haitian Government is more than
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THE PAROLE AUTHORITY

An alternative to the detention of aliens who have been refused
legal entry into the United States is "parole.

'15

A paroled alien

who is physically admitted into the country legally remains as if
she were merely at a United States border seeking admission,"
and, therefore, cannot avail herself of any constitutional
protections.6 1
Although parole power was not statutorily authorized until
1952, the executive branch used it long before then.6 2 The basic
willing to take them back. One issue that does apply to the Haitians is the legality of their initial detention pending the resolution of their asylum claims.
59. The statutory source for the parole power provides:
The Attorney General may, except as provided in subparagraph (B), in his
discretion parole into the United States temporarily under such conditions
as he may prescribe for emergent reasons or for reasons deemed strictly in
the public interest any alien applying for admission to the United States,
but such parole of such alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the
alien and when the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of the
Attorney General, have been served the alien shall forthwith return or be
returned to the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case
shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other
applicant for admission to the United States.
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (1982).
Prior to the enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980, supra note 30, parole was
the customary method by which refugees were admitted into the United States.
60. See 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 23, § 2.54.
61. The assertion of constitutional rights has been predicated on an alien's
proof of having made entry into the United States. See, e.g., Leng May Ma v.
Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596
(1953); In re Application of Phelisna, 551 F. Supp. 960 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
62. F. AUERBACH, IMMIGRATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 370 (1961); 1 C.
GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 23, § 2.54. For example, in Nishimura
Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892), the Court described what we now
recognize as parole in its presentation of the facts of the case:
With this report [Commissioner of Immigration] Thornley sent a letter to
the collector, stating that after a careful examination of the alien immigrants on board the Belgic he was satisfied that the petitioner and five
others were "prohibited from landing by the existing immigration laws,"
... and that, pending the collector's final decision as to their right to
land, he had "placed them temporarily in the Methodist Chinese Mission,
as the steamer was not a proper place to detain them, until the date of
sailing."
Id. at 652-53 (emphasis added).
The use of parole is logically connected to the practice of exclusion, which was
first enacted statutorily in 1875. The current exclusion statute provides for an
inspection and a hearing process, processes that require the use of parole. Be-
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foundations of the use of parole power have never been questioned. Case law reveals blind acceptance of the legitimacy and
use of parole power by the court." The Supreme Court first considered the issue of parole power in Kaplan v. Tod.,4 The Court,
without discussing the legal authority of the Government to use
parole, assumed that its use was totally proper.6 5 The Government generally uses parole to allow the physical inspection of
aliens or to allow excludable persons seeking refuge in the United
States to reside within its borders. The most significant legal aspect of parole is that it precludes an alien from asserting any
rights other than the rights conferred by exclusion statutes.6
The application of parole power by the INS and its absurd legal
consequences have been criticized.6 7 The absurdity of the applica-

cause of the numerous grounds for exclusion, see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(l)-(33)
(1982), and the multitude of refugees coming to the United States, the process
of determining who will stay and who will leave logically requires a figurative
"removal from the vessel" by the INS during the process. One regulation provides that an individual may be paroled "prior to examination ... subsequent
to such examination and pending a final determination of admissibility ... or
after a finding of inadmissibility." 8 C.F.R. § 212.5 (1981).
In accordance with the regulation, the INS officer merely issues the alien a
document called an arrival-departure record (1-94) upon which is affixed " paroled pursuant to Section 212(d)(5) of the INA." The INS Operations Instructions (policy manual) only notes that the parole decision shall not be exercised
below the level of an officer in charge or an immigrant inspector in charge of a
port of entry. See I.N.S., Operations Instructions 212.5a, reprinted in 4 C.
GORDON &

H.

ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW & PROCEDURE

23-167 (1984).

63. The cases reveal that parole was assumed to be a legitimate exercise of
governmental authority. Litigants have never challenged the authority to use
parole and the Supreme Court has never examined parole's legal basis. See, e.g.,
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892); Wan Shing v. United
States, 140 U.S. 424 (1891); Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536 (1884).
64. 267 U.S. 228 (1925).
65. Justice Holmes never used the word "parole" in his opinion. Holmes was
more concerned with the definition of "entry" and its effect of precluding an
alien from gaining United States citizenship through the naturalization of her
father. To obtain citizenship derivatively through one's parents, the statute in
effect at the time required an alien to have been dwelling in the United States.
According to the Court, even though the alien had been allowed to be in the
custody of the Hebrew Society in New York, "[s]he was still in theory of law..
at the boundary line." Id. at 230.
66. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
67. See, e.g., Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 567 F. Supp. 1115 (N.D. Ga. 1983),
rev'd, 734 F.2d 576 (11th Cir. 1984). See Deportationand Exclusion: A Continuing Dialogue Between Congress and the Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 760, 787-88
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tion of the parole fiction is best illustrated by the use of an example. Alien A physically enters the United States through the Mexico-United States border by climbing a barbed wire fence. Alien B
physically enters the United States on a boat which is met on
arrival by INS officials. B is placed in a detention camp but escapes by cutting a hole in the fence and travels to another part of
the country to carry on a new life. Another alien, C, physically
enters the country in the same manner as B and is placed in a
detention camp but is allowed to leave the camp because she has
been sponsored by S. After spending a week with S, C travels to
another part of the country. D enters the country in the same
manner as B and C, is placed in a detention camp, escapes from
the camp, crosses into Mexico, and returns to the United States
to build a new life in another part of the country.
Under accepted immigration doctrine, even though A, B, C and
D have all physically entered the country, only A and D are entitled to constitutional protection because they each effectuated a
legil entry within the meaning intended by the INA.' Aliens who
surreptitiously gain physical entry are rewarded with constitutional protections. Aliens, including the Cuban refugees, however,
who gain physical entry through official channels, are penalized
by the withholding of all constitutional protections.
The mental gymnastics necessary to justify the difference between the treatment of an alien, such as B, who escapes parole,
and the treatment of an alien, such as A or D, who escapes detection at the border, stretch the bounds of logic and reason. Although the Government legitimately needs the exclusion power, it
should not exercise the power to create an unrealistic notion of
entry into the United States that is based entirely on a legal fiction. A system that allows parole to be granted to an alien and
then revoked numerous times without affording any constitutional protections to the alien defies all logic and seems to have a
policy objective as its only justification.
Generally, the use of parole benefits inadmissible aliens. More(1961). In one case, while the court accepted the rule that an alien in parole had

no constitutional rights it noted that "indeed the legal fiction strains credulity
where, as here, one 'stopped at the boundary line' has nevertheless managed to

marry and to father two children in the United States." Stellas v. Esperdy, 250
F. Supp. 85, 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). See also Extending the Constitution to Refugee-Parolees, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 139 (1975).
68. Cf. In re Tanahan, 18 I. & N. Dec. 339 (1981).
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over, the proper exercise of parole power is essential to attaining
the immigration policy objectives of family reunification and
maintaining a humanitarian concern for refugees.6 9 The use of parole power also corrects bureaucratic errors in the adjudication of
visa applications. Historically, otherwise inadmissible aliens were
admitted under parole when justified by compelling humanitarian
reasons. When used in a proper manner, the parole power is of
tremendous benefit both to the alien and to the Government.
70
Consequently, the parole power should not be curtailed.
Limits, however, must be placed on the exercise of parole authority and its effect on the rights of persons who are physically
present in the United States. The exercise of parole power is legitimate to the extent that it permits aliens to be considered for
legal admission. Once the exclusion process has been completed
and parole has been granted and revoked numerous times over a
number of years, the continued use of parole to deny an alien all
legal rights becomes absurd. The present application of parole
power and the legal effect of the parole designation are a mockery
of the exercise of governmental authority in a constitutional
republic.

69. The use of parole is not designed to achieve the immigration policy objective of meeting the employment needs of the United States.
70. Congress has not been critical of the exercise of the parole power in a
nonrefugee context because it does not significantly hinder basic immigration
policy. Most nonrefugee cases are humanitarian oriented and serve the immigration policy of family reunification. The exercise of the parole authority in refugee situations has received major criticism that played an important role in the
enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980, supra note 30.
In 1952 when Congress enacted the McCarran-Walter Act, a Congressional
committee noted that:
[T]he broader discretionary authority is necessary to parole inadmissible
aliens into the United States in emergency cases, such as the case of an
alien who requires immediate medical attention ... and in cases where it
is strictly in the public interest to have an inadmissible alien present in
the United States, such as, for instance, a witness for purposes of
prosecution.
H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess. 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1653,
1706 (1952). Later, in 1965 a Senate committee made a similar comment in enacting an amendment to the immigration laws. See S. REP. No. 748, 89th Cong.
1st Sess. 16-17 (1965); Refugees Under United States Immigration Law, 24
CLEV. ST. L. REv. 528, 532 n.26 (1975). For an excellent discussion of the parole
controversy and the Refugee Act of 1980, see, Anker & Posner, The Forty Year
Crisis:A Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN'DIEGO L. REv. 9,
30-31 (1981).
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The exercise of the parole power by the INS to determine
whether a Cuban refugee will be detained or paroled, is purely
discretionary. Without the INS grant of parole, a Cuban refugee
will remain in detention indefinitely. Similarly, whether a previously granted parole to a Cuban refugee is revoked also lies
within the discretion of the INS. Thus, the INS does not use published guidelines to determine which Cuban refugees will be
granted parole from detention facilities. 71 Because the use of parole as a tool for allowing the admission of otherwise inadmissible
aliens has historically proven beneficial, it is difficult to accept
the current practice of withholding parole as a means of keeping
Cuban refugees in detention indefinitely.
IV.

LIMITATIONS ON THE EXCLUSION POWER

One scholar found the power to exclude aliens limited by domestic and international law.7 2 Although every nation has the
power to exclude aliens, the power is never unlimited. 73 Accordingly, this scholar concludes that the power to exclude is not plenary. Even if one refuses to accept his analysis, a careful review of
the exclusion cases reveals the soundness of the conclusion that
the exclusion power is not plenary.
In The Chinese Exclusion Case 7 4 the Supreme Court refused
to invalidate a statute that required the exclusion of Chinese7 5
and noted that only the Constitution and considerations of public
policy and justice restrict Congress' power to exclude.76 While the
71. The INS, however, abides by the tacit rule that Cuban refugees held in
detention because of "psychological" problems can be paroled only to "acceptable" halfway house sponsors. Of course, "Acceptable" remains undefined, although family members clearly are not proper sponsors. Under the Attorney
General Review Plan, see infra note 110, Cuban refugees in detention at the

Atlanta Penitentiary periodically have been given the opportunity to show a
Justice Department panel that they are not "dangerous." No objective criteria

or guidelines are used in the panels' determinations.
72. Nafziger, supra note 9, at 823-28.
73. Id. at 828.
74.

130 U.S. 581 (1889).

75. The Court mainly discussed the interrelationship of treaties, statutes and
congressional abrogation of treaties. The Court spoke in general terms of the
right of nations to determine their own foreign policy, including the right to

prevent the admission of certain people. See id. at 599-611.
76. Id. at 604. The Court stated:
While under our Constitution and form of government the great mass of

local matters is controlled by local authorities, the United States, in their
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full meaning of the opinion is not entirely clear, the Court presumably intended that the constitutional limitation would be accompanied by a limitation based on judicial review. 7 An application of the constitutional limitations on the "plenary" power to
exclude occurred when the Supreme Court found that lawful permanent residents in exclusion could not be deprived of their
"constitutional rights to procedural due process."7 Therefore,
even though Congress' power to exclude is broad, it is not
absolute.7 9
A second limitation, the "common decency" limitation, has
been used judicially to define the bounds of treatment of the alien
in exclusion." In Rodriquez-Fernandezv. Wilkinson,8 1 for example, the Tenth Circuit posed the hypothetical question whether
the Government could order the execution of an alien in exclusion

without first convicting the alien of a capital crime. The court
relation to foreign countries and their subjects or citizens are one nation,
invested with powers which belong to independent nations, the exercise of
which can be invoked for the maintenance of its absolute independence
and security throughout its entire territory. The powe[r] to ... admit
subjects of other nations to citizenship, [is a] sovereign powe[r], restricted
in [its] exercise only by the constitution itself and considerations of public policy and justice which control, more or less the conduct of all civilized nations.
Id. (emphasis added).
77. "The judiciary has jurisdiction to decide controversies between the
States, and between their respective citizens, as well as questions of National
concern .

. . ."

The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 556 (1870)

(Bradley, J., concurring).
78. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 213 (1953);
Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 601 (1953). The Supreme Court recently decided that an exclusion hearing held upon a re-entry attempt does not
prejudice a lawful permanent resident's rights. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21,
32-33 (1982).
79. Cf. Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455, 1465 (11th Cir. 1983), rev'd on other
grounds, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (the power "over immigration
matters and aliens is plenary and knows few bounds" (emphasis added)).
80. The "common decency" limitation is not necessarily a pure limitation on
power. Rather it may be either a delineation of the point at which the power to
exclude ceases to be absolute, the point at which the power to control the alien
totally lapses or a limitation under international law.
81. 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981). In Wilkinson, a detained Cuban sought
release through habeas corpus after he learned that Cuba refused to allow him
to return to the United States. Id. at 1384. See generally Recent Development,
Indefinite Detention of Excluded Aliens Held Illegal, 17 Tax. INT'L L.J. 101
(1982) (reporting on the Wilkinson case).
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concluded that the cases which prohibit the punishment of aliens
for mere violations of immigration law supported a negative an82
swer to its hypothetical question.
The common decency limitation, however, restricts the Government's detention power only when the conditions of detention impinge upon conventional standards of morality. The limitation
prevents outrageous acts but, as currently developed, falls to define the bounds of the power to exclude. The rarely articulated
limitation, therefore, merely confirms the expectation that aliens
cannot be punished solely for immigration violations.
The infliction of punishment is the exercise of penal authority
and is unrelated to the immigration authority, which is regulatory
in nature. Congress is much more limited in its ability to make
the commission of acts criminal than in its ability to make the
commission of acts grounds for exclusion. Congress' expansive
ability to create appropriate grounds for exclusion is illustrated
by the more than 700 grounds for deportation that one commen82. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d at 1387. The court relied very heavily on Wong
Wing Hang v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896); see also Fang Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
In an unreported district court case both the Government and the court implicitly recognized a common decency limitation on governmental authority. Banos v. Crosland, No. 80-2677 (D.D.C. Dec. 11, 1980). In Banos, Cuban refugees,
who were being detained at a mental hospital in Washington, D.C., filed petitions for habeas corpus challenging their detention and the conditions at the
mental hospital. In the petitions, the refugees alleged that they were forced to
receive thorazine and other strong psychotropic drugs. Implicit in the pleadings
and affidavits was the Cuban refugees' belief that they had the right to refuse
the drug treatments unless they were subject to criminal sanctions and it had
been shown that they were dangerous to themselves or to others. Id. slip op. at
5. The INSIPHS Facility at St. Elizabeth's is not unlike a prison. Cuban refugees are not allowed to walk outside of a barbed wire area of 50' by 150'. The
time allowed outside the barbed wire enclosed area is severely restricted. Cuban
refugees can move freely only in their own "ward" area. The facility employs
more guards, doctors, social workers and other personnel than refugees that it
detains. Some Cuban refugees have requested transfer to the Atlanta federal
penitentiary in lieu of staying at the INS/PHS facility (based on discussions
with doctors at the INS/PHS facility and with attorneys who represent the detained Cubans).
In the past, Cuban refugees feigned illness to secure a transfer to the St. Elizabeth's Mental Hospital's infirmary because they believed that the treatment at
St. Elizabeth's was better (based on conversations with attorneys who represent
the detained Cubans). Doctors at the INS/PHS Evaluation Facility at St. Elizabeth's Hospital admit that many detainees can receive only limited treatment
because of the facility's orientation toward detention and away from treatment.
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tator has found. 3 The common decency standard sets limits on

Congress' expansive authority to regulate immigration. Perhaps
courts that have used the common decency standard intended to
say that governmental actions are reprehensible when tantamount to criminal sanctions and, therefore, fall outside Congress'
84
immigration authority.

No case that addresses the exclusion issue distinguishes between the power to exclude and the power to control an alien
once excluded. Understanding this subtle distinction may help resolve the indefinite detention dilemma. Congress derives the authority to control immigration from both the Constitution and
the inherent sovereign powers of a nation.8 5 Congress has used its
authority to establish grounds and procedures to aid in the deter83. Wasserman, The Undemocratic, Illogical and Arbitrary Immigration
Laws of the United States, 3 INT'L LAW. 254, 260 (1969); see also Gordon, The
Need to Modernize Our Immigration Laws, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 2 (1975).
84. In Fiallo v. Levi, 406 F. Supp. 162 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd sub nom., Fiallo
v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977), a three-judge panel wrote: "Unless the immigration
laws in question are wholly devoid of any conceivable rational purpose, or are
fundamentally aimed at achieving a goal unrelated to the regulation of immigration, they are not unconstitutional encroachments ...

."

Id. at 166 (footnotes

omitted). The Fiallo reasoning is not a per se finding that indefinite detention
falls outside the immigration authority of Congress but it certainly lends support to the theory. Another limit on Congress' authority to regulate immigration
is its inability to exclude, or banish, United States citizens. Banishment is specifically prohibited, and, thus, outside Congress' immigration-regulating function. While the Supreme Court has not addressed the constitutionality of banishment from the United States in a non-immigration context, such conditions
have been found to be unconstitutional and characterized as cruel and unusual
punishment when applied to aliens. See Jung v. United States, 312 F.2d 73 (9th
Cir. 1962); see also Rutherford v. Blankenship, 468 F.Supp. 1357, 1360 (W.D.
Va. 1979). In one case in which a court was faced with the question whether a
person's sentence could be commuted on the condition that he not return to the
state, the court noted that such a sentence could be considered a violation of
personal rights, but rights that had been bargained away. Carchedi v. Rhodes,
560 F.Supp. 1010, 1015-16 (S.D. Ohio 1982). A number of other constitutional
rights would be implicated if Congress attempted to banish citizens from the
United States, including the right to travel freely, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); and the right of
association with friends and loved ones, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
In addition, the argument that United States citizens cannot be banished
from the United States is supported by the fact that the immigration laws only
apply to aliens. See 1A C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 23, § 4.5a.
85. See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889); Nishimura
Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892).
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mination of an alien's admissibility to the United States. The Executive, through the INS, works within the statutory scheme by
deciding whether an alien falls into an inadmissible class.8 6 Thus,

the INS, which enforces the legislative mandate of Congress, may
not unilaterally exclude new classes of persons.87 Once the INS
captures an alien and determines his excludability, it has completed a large portion of its job."' The Government, of course, also
should supervise aliens between the time they are apprehended
and the time of the exclusion hearing."9 Congress allows the INS
to admit aliens temporarily while retaining the power to later exclude them.90 The INS may detain aliens, a practice that currently remains the exception rather than the rule; require the
posting of bond; or impose other conditions on the ability of an
alien to obtain freedom when his exclusion hearing is pending 1
86. 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 23, § 2.26. The D.C. Circuit
stated in dicta, however, that the Executive could take certain actions in the
immigration area based upon its foreign affairs powers. See Narenji v. Civiletti,
617 F.2d 745, 747-48 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 957 (1980); see also
Yassini v. Crosland, 618 F.2d 1356, 1362 (9th Cir. 1980) (allowing INS to revoke
deferral of departure dates for Iranian nationals); Olegario v. United States, 629
F.2d 204, 226-28 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 450 U.S. 980 (1980) (Executive discretion
allowed when delicate foreign affairs matter implicated). The Narenji and Yassini holdings do not apply to the Executive actions in the Freedom Flotilla situation because in both cases, the President was acting in an emergency when
attempting to negotiate the release of the United States hostages in Iran.
87. See 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFMLD, supra note 23, § 2.2b; United States
ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950); Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S.
3, 9 (1915). In Narenji, the D.C. Circuit found that the Executive had certain
powers as a result of its foreign policy responsibilities. 617 F.2d at 647-48; see
supra note 86. Narenji is again distinguishable from the Cuban refugees' case
because in Narenji the Executive was merely selectively enforcing the INA, not
creating a new ground for exclusion.
88. An apprehended alien is placed in exclusion or deportation proceedings
and is under the jurisdiction of an immigration judge. If the administrative procedures and judicial appeals result in a final order of exclusion, the alien should
be deported immediately. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (1982). The primary role of the
INS, therefore, is to apprehend aliens, present them before an immigration
judge and effect their departure if necessary.
89. The INA provides that exclusion hearings before an immigration judge
will be conducted as soon as possible. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226, 1227.
90. See supra notes 36, 59-61 and accompanying text (discussing parole).
The INS also may allow a temporary admission to complete the inspection process. 8 U.S.C. § 1223(a). An alien who is outside INS custody and has not been
legally admitted is most likely parole status.
91. 8 C.F.R. §§ 212.5(a), 235.3(b) (1984).
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Exclusion statutes and regulations are based exclusively on the
grounds and procedures for procuring the speedy exclusion and
deportation of aliens. 2 The statutes omit any reference to the
conferral of authority on the INS to control aliens subsequent to
the issuance of an order of exclusion 93 and, therefore, apparently
do not specifically confer authority on the INS to detain excluded
94
aliens indefinitely.
The statutes also fail to specify the authority granted the INS
over excluded aliens who cannot be deported or the length of time
the INS can exercise its dual power to control such individuals. It
is the author's belief that the INS' authority should continue almost totally unfettered while preparations are being made to deport an individual who has received an order of exclusion. As efforts to deport an excluded alien either cease or become
impracticable,9 5 the INS' authority over the alien should diminish

92. The INA provides that
[a]liens shall be detained on board the vessel or at the airport of arrival
•.. unless the Attorney General directs their detention in a United States
immigration station or other place specified by him ... for a sufficient
time to enable the immigration officers and medical officers to subject such
aliens to observation and examination sufficient to determine whether or
not they belong to the excluded classes.
8 U.S.C. § 1222 (emphasis added). While not precise, the term "sufficient time"
cannot be construed to mean an indefinite amount of time.
The INA also provides for further mental and physical examination of aliens
and a review of the attending physician's conclusions by a medical review board.
42 C.F.R. § 34.4 (1984). During the inspection process, an alien cannot be excluded but is considered "excludable." The entire process should be concluded
immediately following the exclusion order. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(e). One writer believes that a 1981 change in the INA allows prolonged detention, Note, The
ConstitutionalRights of Excluded Aliens: ProposedLimitations on the Indefinite Detention of the Cuban Refugees, 70 GEO. L.J. 1303, 1304 n.11 (1982), but
such an interpretation does not appear to be accurate. The INA was amended
merely to expand the deportation power by allowing aliens to be deported to any
country. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2); H.R. REP. No. 264, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 24,
reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2577, 2593.
93. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227. In contrast, deportation statutes contemplate the
possibility or impracticability of deportation by providing for the release and
supervision of deportable aliens. See id. § 1252(c).
94. Courts, however, have upheld the postexclusion order authority to control aliens by reasoning that the authority is a logical extension of the power to
exclude. See Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 567 F. Supp. 1115, 1122-24 (N.D. Ga.
1983), rev'd, 734 F.2d 576 (11th Cir. 1984).
95. The Cuban Government has steadfastly refused to allow excluded Cuban
refugees to return and has ignored all United States efforts. On May 25, 1983 a
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until the INS ceases to have any authority to detain an alien. As
time passes the Government only needs to know the whereabouts
of an alien. This concept of diminishing control parallels the
treatment accorded persbns to be deported and most persons in
exclusion. 6 When an exclusion order is rendered unenforceable
through "impossibility of performance" the INS' control over an
excluded alien should be limited.
Policy arguments that favor limiting the INS' authority are
compelling because, in most cases, no other country will accept
the Cuban refugees once they are excluded. Consequently, a finding of excludability by the INS has absolutely no effect on a Cuban refugee's continued presence in the United States. The INS'
inability to execute the exclusion order, therefore, ends its practical ability to control the Cuban aliens and should effectively terminate its day to day control of their activities. From a policy
standpoint, it is a waste of government resources for the INS to
act as nursemaid to excluded aliens who cannot be deported. This
is particularly objectionable when there is no factual support for
the presumption that aliens in exclusion endanger the health or
well-being of the general population.
In the postexclusion stage for aliens who cannot be deported,
the government involvement should be either purely penal, if the
person has committed a crime, or medical, if the person is suffering from medical or psychological illnesses. The INS' involvement
at this stage does not benefit the country or the alien, and when
an alien is in need of medical treatment, INS involvement most
likely prevents the effective treatment of the individual because

diplomatic note was delivered to the Cuban Government. The note contained

the INA provision that prohibits the United States from granting immigrant
visas to Cuban-Americans in the United States who are petitioning for their

families in Cuba. See INS Puts Cuba on Visa Sanctions List, 60 INTERPRETER
RELEASES

666 (1983); see also 8 C.F.R. § 243.8 (1984); Leich, Contemporary

Practice of the United States Relating to InternationalLaw, 77 AM. J. INT'L L.
875 (1983). It is not known whether Cuba even responded to the note.
96. See supra note 94. If no country will accept a person, Congress' attempt
to exclude certain aliens is totally frustrated. If the Cuban refugees are here

permanently, as it appears they are, the statutory authority of the INS over
them is eliminated. From a legal and practical standpoint, persons who have

been ordered deported but who cannot be deported are identical to excluded
aliens. While neither group is welcome in the country nor has a greater right to
stay than the other, neither should be under the total authority of the INS. The
anomaly is that the judicial interpretations consider the excluded alien, not the
deportable alien, to be under the exclusive control of the INS.
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of the limited treatment capabilities within a detention facility.9"
Placing excludable aliens with psychological problems in conventional mental institutions would likely prepare them for an ultimate entry into society. Maintaining special psychological evaluation centers for the Cuban refugees only causes a further drain on
the public treasury. Similarly, maintaining special detention centers where Cuban refugees may spend the rest of their lives for
the commission of civil wrongs cannot be justified by the added
expense to the public.
Even though Congress has exercised its "plenary" power over
immigration by delegating it to the Executive, the INS clearly
lacks statutory authority to control postexclusion aliens. Presumptively, a power not delegated cannot be exercised. The INS,
the authority to control postherefore, is not entitled to exercise
9
texclusion aliens by implication. 8
V.

THE PAROLE/DETENTION DILEMMA

The Refugee Act of 198099 creates a mechanism for the orderly
admission of refugees into the United States. This Act provides a
method for determining whether Cuban refugees should be admitted,100 but instead of using this method, the INS paroled Cuban refugees into the country, placed them in detention facilities,
and then, as sponsors were found, paroled them into the sponsors'
custody. 10 1
97. See supra note 82. If treatment is not as effective in a detention facility
as it is in conventional health care institutions, placing the Cuban refugees in
the appropriate institutions would seem to be a better use of the money currently being spent to detain the aliens.
98. The same result would follow if, for example, the Executive were to issue
a new policy to direct the exclusion of all persons who happen to be Asian.
99. Supra note 30.
100. See 8 U.S.C. § 1157(b) (1982).
101. Although it severely criticized and tried to restrict the use of parole,
Congress did not specifically prohibit its use. 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD,
supra note 23, § 2.54; see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(b). Some have argued that later
congressional action, see Refugee Education Assistance Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-422, 94 Stat. 1799 (Codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1522 note), placed a
stamp of approval on the exercise of the parole power. See Note, The Indefinite
Detention of Excluded Aliens: Statutory and ConstitutionalJustificationsand
Limitations, 82 MicH. L. REv. 61, 76 (1983). It is the author's belief, however,
that Congress was faced with a fait accompli. Congress was told that asylum
applications were being processed on a "case by case" basis. See H.R. REP. No.
1218, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
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The only options that an alien legally may use to physically
"enter" the United States are with a valid visa, through asylum,
or under a grant of parole. 10 2 Because most Cuban refugees did
not have valid visas and because asylum applications were rarely
even processed, 0 3 the only viable alternative that allowed a Cuban refugee to gain physical access to the United States was the
grant of parole. Under immigration law, however, the condition
precedent to constitutional protection is legal entry into the
United States. 104 The grant of parole does not constitute legal entry'0 5 and, therefore, does not afford constitutional protection to
the Cuban refugee.
Current INS policy, which offers parole to the refugee, presents
3810, 3813. It had to decide whether to provide money to the states for assisting
the Cuban refugees, not to determine their future treatment.
102. For the statutory definition of "entry," see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13). The
use of the term "legal" is meant only to indicate an entry after some inspection
by the INS. See generally 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(20), 1158(a). It should not be
confused with legal entry into the country. A paroled alien has not gained legal
entry into the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5); Siu Fung Luk v. Rosenberg,
409 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1969).
103. Most immigration attorneys are well aware of the refusal of the INS to
process asylum applications. The trial court in Fernandez-Roque required certain applications to be processed, but the reversal of the trial court by the Eleventh Circuit may impair continued processing. See Fernandez-Roque v. Smith,
867 F. Supp. 1118 (N.D. Ga. 1983), rev'd, 734 F.2d 576 (11th Cir. 1984); Scanlan,
Regulating Refugee Flow: Legal Alternatives and Obligations Under the Refugee Act of 1980, 56 NOTRE DAmE LAW. 618, 621 n.36 (1981).
An alien granted asylum has entered the country legally and may eventually
obtain lawful permanent residence. 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b) (1982). The INS' failure
to process Cuban refugee asylum applications keeps the alien in the status of an
applicant for entry. As applicants for entry, their continued detention is legally
justified. Many of the Cubans who arrived in the Freedom Flotilla probably harbor well-founded fears of persecution in Cuba. Under the Refugee Act of 1980,
the Cubans could be granted asylum, which would result in legal entry, freedom
from all restraint, and afford them all constitutional protections. See supra
notes 100-101 and accompanying text.
One alternative to granting asylum is "withholding of deportation." This device gives the alien a safe haven in the United States but does not provide the
future benefits of permanent residency or eventual citizenship. See 8 U.S.C. §
1253(h); In re Lam, 18 I. & N. Dec. 15 (1981).
104. Because the Supreme Court has held that the INA may define entry
requirements, Congress, in effect, determines who will receive constitutional protections. See, e.g., Reid v. INS, 420 U.S. 619 (1975) , Leng May Ma v. Barber,
357 U.S. 185 (1958); United States ex rel. Brancato v. Lehman, 239 F.2d 663
(6th Cir. 1956).
105. See supra note 102.
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even the paroled Cuban refugees with several major problems.
First, paroled Cuban refugees are constantly subject to the possibility of rearrest because the grant of parole is discretionary and
is easily revoked. 0 6 Second, the INA restricts the immigration of
an alien's family members unless the alien is either a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen. 10 7 Thus, the Cuban refugees' parole status prevents future family reunification. Third,
the lack of entry for the paroled Cubans keeps them in a state of
limbo because they cannot return to their country, but can only
remain in the United States as "non-persons" with very few
rights.
As discussed earlier, detention has been used in conjunction
with parole to control the Cuban refugees. The initial argument
used by the Government in support of detention asserted that its
use was necessary to control the refugees pending their exclusion
hearings, 08 although the Government had no idea when hearings
would be held. The Government then advanced the argument
that an exclusion order issued in an exclusion hearing would
render the excluded Cuban refugee ineligible for federal benefits. 0 9 The Government used review panels of Department of Justice employees to determine whether certain Cuban refugees were
eligible for parole. 1 0

106. 1A C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 23, § 3.17c.
107. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(b), 1152(e)(1)-(2).
108. See Alonso-Martinez v. Meissner, No. 81-2233, slip op. at 4 (D.D.C. Oct.
16, 1981), vacated as moot, 697 F.2d 1160 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Banos v. Crosland,
No. 80-2677, slip op. at 8 (D.D.C. Dec. 11, 1980).
109. See Alonso-Martinez v. Meissner, 697 F.2d 1160, 1163 n.9 (D.C. Cir.
1983). The validity of this argument must be questioned. Under the Refugee
Education Assistance Act of 1980, an alien who is granted asylum is eligible for
benefits. 8 U.S.C. § 1522 note (§ 101(3)(c)). Many paroled Cuban refugees with
final exclusion orders still receive benefits. Thus, the only benefits that an excludable Cuban might not receive any longer are state impact funds (based on
conversations with attorneys who represent detained Cubans). The counter argument, however, recognizes two weaknesses in the government's argument.
First, the individual Cuban should decide whether she wishes to run the risk
that her benefits, if any are being received, will be cut off simply because it has
not happened in the past with Cubans who had final orders of exclusion. Second, it is not clear that the benefits will be cut off because they have not been
terminated. Third, if the person is granted asylum she is no longer an "entrant"
and may be able to present a constitutional argument challenging the termination of her benefits.
110. The Attorney General's Status Review Plan was initiated by the Government under an agreement reached by the parties in Fernandez-Roque.Under
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Detained Cuban refugees can be released into the community
only if paroled by the INS. The absence of any clear INS guidelines for granting parole"' makes it extremely difficult for a detained Cuban refugee to know how to improve her chances of being paroled. Similarly, no clear INS guidelines for parole
revocation exist. Parole generally is revoked when the parolee's
sponsorship "breaks down."". 2 Breakdowns may occur when an

alien becomes distressed, because a sponsor loses interest in its
parolee, or for various other reasons. The reason for the breakdown, however, is irrelevant because the mere lack of a sponsor
will justify the revocation of parole. The Cuban refugee's only opportunity to challenge the revocation is by filing for a writ of
habeas corpus. 1 3 Cuban refugees, especially those without immediate family in the United States, often do not challenge their
parole revocations. 1 4 The revocation process immediately returns
the refugee to, or places her in, a detention facility. Between an
alien's arrest and her removal to a detention facility, she may be
the plan, Department of Justice employees conduct interviews with detained
Cuban refugees, review the refugee's files, and make recommendations to the
INS Commissioner about whether the alien should be paroled.
Cuban refugees who are not members of the class in Fernandez-Roqueare not
subject to the review plan. The class as certified includes only the Cuban refugees incarcerated at the Atlanta Penitentiary. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 91
F.R.D. 117, 126 (N.D. Ga. 1981). For a full explanation of the procedures of the
review plan, see the district court opinion in Fernandez-Roque, 567 F. Supp.
1115, 1130-31 (N.D. Ga. 1983). The continued existence of the review plan is
questionable because Fernandez-Roque was reversed on appeal. 734 F.2d 576
(11th Cir. 1984). After the reversal, the Government is not compelled to proceed
with the review plan.
111. Regulations refer only to the discretion of the INS. The INS will not
allow many detainees at the INS/PHS Facility to be paroled even to family
members in the United States.
112. The INS often does not learn of a breakdown until the parolee encounters problems or goes to the INS with questions about her immigration
status.
113. See, e.g., Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 1982).
114. Cuban refugees, like other aliens, are usually unfamiliar with the United
States immigration system and find it difficult to procure legal counsel. For example, even though an attorney supervised the class in Fernandez-Roque,most
Cuban refugees did not have counsel when they went before the review panels.
The Cuban refugees' only advocates are the attorneys working on each individual case. Even when a Cuban refugee has legal counsel, however, INS officials
often fail to notify the attorney that his client's parole has been revoked (based
on conversations with attorneys who represent detained Cubans).
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handed a notice of parole revocation." 5 Thus, any notion that parole of the Cuban refugee equates to a grant of absolute freedom
is simply a misconception.
After the Supreme Court's decision in Shaughnessy v. United
States ex rel. Mezei,"1 scholars speculated that the Court had
allowed limited rights for aliens in exclusion because the Court
was satisfied that the procedures in the exclusion statutes accorded aliens sufficient protections." 7 The use of the parole fic-tion for the Cuban refugees raises doubts about the fundamental
fairness afforded these aliens. Although aliens in exclusion may
not be entitled to constitutional protections, it is difficult to argue
that they are totally without the legal rights emanating from international law. The rights of individuals do not depend upon citizenship in a state. All individuals have basic rights that are independent of their national identity or lack thereof. Accordingly, a
right does not cease to exist simply because the source of that
right is not found in our Constitution.
VI. INTERNATIONAL LAW
One issue not addressed by the courts is whether indefinitely
detained aliens have protections other than those found in the
Constitution. This Article suggests that the courts must look beyond their conclusion that the Constitution does not protect
aliens in exclusion to find possible protections inherent in international law. More important, international law provides a great
deal of guidance in resolving the legality of indefinite detention of
aliens in exclusion, particularly because domestic law is vague on
the issue of extended detention.
If the courts had concluded that the Cuban refugees in indefinite detention deserved constitutional or "constitution-like" protections," 8 an examination of international legal standards would
have been unnecessary. A Supreme Court decision favorable to
the refugees based on domestic statutes would have been far bet-

115. The regulations require written notice. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(d)(2) (1984).
116; 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
117. See Davis, The Requirement of a Trial-Type Hearing,70 HARv. L. REv.
193, 277-80 (1956); see also Recent Cases, Right of Due Process in Exclusion
Proceedings, 33 NEB. L. REv. 94, 96 (1953); Note, Exclusion from the United
States Without a Hearing, 27 S. CAL. L. REv. 315, 321 (1956).
118. "Constitutional-like" protections refer to Supreme Court-fashioned
remedies based on statutes rather than the Constitution.
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ter than a decision based on international law because the latter
subordinates domestic law to international standards. Because
the Supreme Court decisions regarding the rights of aliens in exclusion so poorly define domestically cognizable rights, however,
-the rights embodied in international law must now be explored. 11 9
In exploring whether international law supports the proposition
that indefinite detention of aliens is impermissible when no other
country will accept the aliens, this Article advocates that customary international law prohibits the practice of indefinite
detention.
In recent years the body of codified standards from international law that protect human rights has expanded enormously.
In the twentieth century the signing of many multilateral agreements has established norms for the protection of human rights.
Since the holocaust of World War 11, the international community has become increasingly concerned with human rights. This
concern, initially expressed only in multinational agreements, recently has become embodied in the domestic statutes of individual nations. The growth and development of international and
domestic human rights standards symbolically support the argument that the right to be free from indefinite detention is cognizable under international law. Since World War II the recognition
of human rights has become a legitimate concern of international
law and a goal of foreign relations. The United States, for example, currently uses human rights as an instrument of foreign policy in its dealings with other nations.120
A.

International Agreements

More than twenty-one international agreements currently address human rights issues. This Article will explore only the
119.

The Supreme Court has held consistently that aliens in exclusion are

not protected by the Constitution. It is the author's opinion that granting constitutional protections to an alien who is beyond the point of exclusion is the
better approach. The following discussion proceeds assuming the Supreme Court
has rejected the constitutional rights argument.
120. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151n(a), 2304(a)(2) (1982). For an outline of
Congress' intent, see id § 2151. The use of foreign policy as a human rights

enforcement tool has not gone without criticism. See HUMAN

RIGHTS AND

U.S.

HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY: THEORETICAL APPROACHES AND SOME PERSPECTIVES ON
LATIN AMERICA

5-29, 53-59 (H. Wiarda ed. 1982); see also Boyle, International

Law as a Basis for Conducting American Foreign Policy, 8 YALE J. WORLD PUB.
ORD. 103 (1982) (arguing that the practice is contrary to international law).
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agreements that address the issue of indefinite detention. The
United Nations agreements on indefinite detention include the
United Nations Charter, the Convention Relating to the Status of
Stateless

Persons, 121 the

Rights, 22

Universal

Declaration

of Human

23

the Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status
of Refugees, 24 the International Covenant on Civil and Political

Rights 25 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949.126

The United Nations Charter, one of the few international
agreements signed by the United States, created the United Nations and reaffirmed "faith in fundamental human rights, in the
dignity and worth of the human person.'

127

The Charter demands

no specific duties and obligations from its signatories, but requires member nations to work toward the establishment of universal respect for human rights and fundamental freedom for all
persons. 28
The Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons defines stateless persons as those "not considered as a national by
any state.' 1 29 Individuals who have lost their nationality presum-

ably come within this definition. For example, when the members
of the Freedom Flotilla left Cuba designated as traitors, they
121. Done Sept. 28, 1954, 360 U.N.T.S. 117 [hereinafter cited as Convention
on Stateless Persons].
122. G.A. Res. 217, 3 U.N. GAOR 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter

cited as Universal Declaration].
123.. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T.
6259, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
124. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, done Jan. 31, 1967, 19
U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
125. G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16 at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966) [hereinafter cited as ICCPR]. For a discussion of the history and implementation of the ICCPR, see Mose & Opsahl, The Optional Protocol to the InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights, 21 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 271
(1981).
126. Reference to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 includes the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, and the Geneva Convention Relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
127. U.N. CHARTER preamble.
128. The U.N. Charter states that the members of the United Nations are
determined "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small." Id.
129. Convention on Stateless Persons, supra note 121, art. 1(a).
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were taunted by government-organized crowds. Many had been
threatened by Cuban authorities who warned that they could
never return to Cuba.1 30 Pronouncements by Fidel Castro supported these threats.13 ' Under Cuban law, the circumstances surrounding the refugees' departure and the departure itself were
13 2
grounds for loss of Cuban nationality.
Thus, the Cuban refugees bear all the indicia of stateless persons, although an extremely conservative reading of the Convention could lead to a different conclusion. 133 The Cuban Government's refusal to accept the return of its citizens even upon final
orders of exclusion issued by the INS is an act of abandonment
that leaves the Freedom Flotilla members without a spokesperson
or advocate in the world community. An alien's main advocate is
usually the government of his original country. The members of
the Freedom Flotilla, however, have no governmental body to advocate their case. The Convention on Stateless Persons is evidence of the world community's special concern for the welfare of
persons in situations similar to the Cuban refugees. When aggregated with other international agreements, the evidence creates a
strong argument for the viability of the use of customary international law to protect the rights of displaced persons.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, although not a
self-executing document, evinces the United Nations' strong concern for the recognition of fundamental human rights. The Declaration, like the United States Declaration of Independence and
Constitution, provides everyone with the "right to life, liberty and
the security of person,1 ' 34 entitles everyone to recognition "as a
person before the law,' 35 and prohibits arbitrary "arrest, detention or exile."'' *3 Although without the force of an executed treaty,

130. N.Y. Times, May 3, 1980, at 1, col. 6; N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1980, at Al,
col. 5; N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1980, at E2, col. 1.
131. See Granma, Sept. 16, 1980 at 1 (Granma is the official newspaper of
the Cuban Communist Party).
132. CONSTITUCION art. 32(c) (Cuba), reprinted and translated in 4 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE WORLD (A.Blaustein & G. Flauz eds. 1979); see also, Klein, The
Socialist Constitution of Cuba (1976), 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 451, 478-83
(1978).
133. None of the court opinions dealing with the rights of Cuban refugees
have considered whether the refugees are actually stateless.
134. Universal Declaration, supra note 122, art. 3.
135. Id. art. 6.

136. Id. art. 9.
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the Universal Declaration both embodies a standard by which all
nations can be judged and aids in an understanding of the current
status of international custom.
The Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 137 which became effective in 1968, are the principal international agreements that address the fundamental right to leave
one's country to seek and enjoy asylum. The Refugee Act of
1980138 was enacted to make United States immigration practice
more consistent with the Protocol. 3 Currently, more than seventy nations are parties to the Convention and Protocol. The Protocol provides that host countries will grant persons who have a
"well-founded fear of being persecuted" in their own country on
account of "race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or [for] political opinion" will be granted rights in
the host country that are
similar to the rights enjoyed by nation140
als of the host country.

Using the test that the Protocol provides, the members of the
Freedom Flotilla clearly should have been given refugee status.
They perceived themselves as refugees; when they arrived at
United States shores they requested asylum and completed asylum applications. The INS, however, has yet to process most of
the asylum applications. 14 ' The deliberate inaction by the INS
apparently disregards the Protocol, the Refugee Act of 1980, and
the INS regulations. 142 The inaction avoids according the refugees

137.
138.
139.
Cong.,

See supra notes 123-24.
Supra note 30.
See H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 18; S. REP. No. 256, 96th
1st Sess. 9, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 141, 149; H.
CONF. REP. No. 781, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 20, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 160, 161.See generally Anker & Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A
Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 9 (1981).
140. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 124, art.
l(A)(2).
141. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
142. INS regulations state that "[u]pon receipt of Form 1-589, the district
director shall in all cases request an advisory opinion from the Bureau of
Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (BHRHA) of the Department of
State." 8 C.F.R. § 208.7 (1984); see also id. §§ 108.1, 208.1, 208.3(a), 208.9(b).
Absolutely no action was taken on the Cuban refugees' asylum applications.
The government has advanced the argument that preventing the Cuban refugees
from becoming ineligible for public benefits through a grant of asylum or a finding of excludability was the reason for the INS' inaction. The authority cited for
this position was section 501(e) of the Refugee Education Assistance Act of
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the rights they would have received upon legal entry and leaves
the Cuban refugees knocking at the United States legal border
without a constitutional footing.
United States courts that have addressed the indefinite detention cases barely mentioned the INS inaction. 143 The courts seem
unwilling
to recognize a special status for aliens applying for asylum. 144 If the purpose of the Protocol was to require signatory
nations to treat aliens fleeing persecution on a similar footing
with nationals of the host country, the INS inaction seems to violate the Protocol purposes. Furthermore, United Nations guidelines on the recognition of refugees state that a person is a refugee when he fulfills the Protocol's criteria and that "refugee
recognition" necessarily occurs prior to the time the host country
gives formal recognition. 145 In view of the special concerns expressed in international law, United States courts should recognize the rights that inure to the Cuban refugees and all other
aliens even when in exclusion.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), 46 which currently has been signed by more than sixty
nations, contains provisions that specifically apply to the question
of detention. Together with the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICSCR), 47 which has also
1980, supra note 101. For comments regarding this position, see supra note 109.
143. See, e.g., Alonso-Martinez v. Meissner, 697 F.2d 1160, 1163 (D.C. Cir.
1983).
144. In Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984), the Eleventh Circuit
held that refugees do not have a statutory or constitutional right to be notified
of the right to apply for asylum. Id. at 983. The Jean court intended in part to
clarify Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982) where the
three judge panel seemed to interpret the Refugee Act as creating a "right to
petition for asylum." Id. at 1038; see Jean, 727 F.2d at 976 n.27. Contra
Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 376 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (Refugee
Act requires notice of the right to apply for asylum); see also Nunez v. Boldin,
537 F. Supp. 578, 586 (S.D. Tex. 1982), appeal dismissed, 692 F.2d 755 (5th Cir.
1982). The far-reaching Jean decision sought to limit the rights of aliens in
exclusion.
145. UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at 9. The Board of Immigration Appeals has referred to the Handbook for guidance. The Handbook is a well-recognized source of international refugee custom because the U.N. High Commissioner is regarded as very experienced in refugee matters. See McMullen v. INS,
658 F.2d 1312, 1319 (9th Cir. 1981); In re Rodriguez-Palma, 17 L & N. Dec. 465,
468 (1980).
146. Supra note 125.
147. G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316
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been widely accepted, the ICCPR treats detention realistically by
recognizing the effects of detention that go beyond the impairment of individual liberties. Both Covenants recognize that detention necessarily prevents free expression, work, exchange of
ideas, education, and other fundamental rights, which are referred to in international agreements, but are often taken for
granted. The ICSCR gives special protection to each of these valuable rights and prohibits countries from impinging on the enumerated individual rights except when necessary to protect na148
tional security or public order.

The ICCPR does not distinguish between persons applying for
entry at a country's border and those who have already entered
the country, but rather speaks of persons "within its territory and
subject to its jurisdiction.' ' 49 The ICCPR reiterates the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights' forceful recognition of an individual's inherent right to life, 50 freedom from arbitrary arrest or detention,'65 and freedom from inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment. 15

2

The Covenant

neither distinguishes between

aliens in exclusion and deportation, nor recognizes the legal fiction of parole. The ICCPR, however, provides that an alien who is
lawfully within a country may be expelled, but only after receiving the opportunity to present his case. 53
The ICCPR delineates various individual rights such as the
right to be free from arrest and detention. Individuals receive
these rights based upon their physical presence within a country
rather than upon the status bestowed by the host country. Only
individuals who have been duly convicted of crimes, or whose exclusion can be justified as a means of protecting national security
and the preservation of public order are deprived of the full com(1966) [hereinafter cited as ICSCR].
148. ICSCR, supra note 147, art. 8. The ICCPR also established methods to
enforce its prohibitions. A Human Rights Committee was established, ICCPR,

supra note 125, art. 1, and authorized to review the claims of individuals who
allege violations of their rights. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.16) at
59, art. 2(1), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
149. ICCPR, supra note 125, art. 2.

150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. art. 6.
Id. art. 9.
Id. art. 7.
See id. art. 13.
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plement of ICCPR rights.15 4
International law has always demonstrated a strong concern for
both combatants and civilians during time of war. The Geneva
Conventions of 1949155 provide an additional international source
of support for an understanding of the rights available to the Cuban refugees in detention. A number of common concerns are
evinced in the Geneva Conventions, but the concerns most relevant to the issue at hand are those dealing with the rights of interned civilians. The Convention maintains a general policy
against the detention of civilian noncombatants by allowing internment only when a civilian presents a risk to national security
or voluntarily appears for internment. 156 The Cuban refugees
would appear to come within the definition of civilian noncombatants because they are civilians, rather than citizens of a nation at
war with the United States, and because they have not been labelled as national security risks. Thus, a straightforward application of the Geneva Conventions suggests that the Cuban refugees
currently have fewer rights than prisoners of war, a result that
clearly is illogical and inconsistent with international law.

154. Id. arts. 4, 8.
155. Supra note 126.
156. The Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War, supra note 126, provides that:
[any interned person] shall be entitled to have such action reconsidered as
soon as possible by an appropriate court or administrative board ....
If
the internment or placing in assigned residences is maintained, the court
or administrative board shall periodically, and at least twice yearly, give
consideration to his or her case with a view to the favourable amendment
of the initial decision.
Id. art. 43. The Convention further provides that the internment of civilians is
allowed only when "absolutely necessary" to the security interests of the occupying forces. Id. art. 42.
The Conventions also provide (1) that prisoners be treated humanely whether
they are in detention or otherwise, without reference to their "race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any similar criteria," Convention Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 126, art. 3(1) (emphasis
added); (2) persons who take no active part in wars or civilians require similar
protection as noted in (1) above, Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, supra note 126, art. 3(1); (3) persons detained as
saboteurs or spies "shall. . . be treated with humanity, and in case of trial, shall
not be deprived of the rights of fair and regular trial," id. art. 5; (4) the wounded
and sick "shall be the object of particular protection and respect," id. art. 16;
and (5) those in an occupied territory who have lost their employment "shall be
granted the opportunity to find paid employment," id. art. 39 (emphasis added).
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The preceding analysis of numerous international agreements
provides insight into the most basic human rights of life, liberty,
and freedom from inhuman or degrading punishment, which are
currently recognized by the international community. When
viewed collectively these agreements lead to the undeniable conclusion that every individual, whether civilian or prisoner of war,
is entitled to the basic human rights enumerated above. It is
shocking that the United States would provide a prisoner of war
or alleged criminal with better protections than the indefinitely
detained Cuban refugees.
B.

Regional Agreements

The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention), 6 the OAS Charter,"5' the American Convention on Human Rights,' 59 and the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man' 60 are important regional agreements that address human rights questions.
A review of the regional agreements will further demonstrate the
abhorrence of indefinite detention under international law.
The European Convention, which has become the model for regional agreements on human rights,16' encompasses the rights and
protections contained in both the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the United Nations Charter. The European
Convention specifically enumerates basic rights of life,'6 2 protection from torture or inhuman treatment, 6 3 freedom from slav-

157. Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter cited as European.
Convention].
.158. Dec. 13, 1951, 119 U.N.T.S. 48.
159. Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, reprinted in 9 LL.M. 99 (1970) [hereinafter cited as American Convention].
160. Res. XXX, 9th Int'l Conf. of American States, Pan American Union
(1948) [hereinafter cited as American Declaration].
161. The legislative history of the American Declaration is replete with references to the European Convention. There is also a great deal of similarity in
language between the two agreements. See 2 T. BUERGENTHAL & R. NoRRIs,
HUMAN RIGHTS LAWS OF THE INTERAMERICAN SYSTEM,

binder 12, at 29 (1983).

The Universal Declaration, supra note 122, provided the initial foundation for
both the European and American Conventions. See Buergenthal, The American
and European Conventions on Human Rights; Similaritiesand Differences, 30
Ai. U.L. REv. 155 (1980).
162. European Convention, supra note 157, art. 2.
163. Id. art. 3.
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ery, 64 and the right to be free from arbitrary arrest or
detention.16 5
The American Convention on Human Rights embodies the
western hemisphere's concern for human rights. The American
Convention, patterned after the European Convention, provides
that the infliction of penal punishment shall be limited to criminally convicted individuals 6 6 and that the deprivation of physical
liberty shall occur only under conditions specifically covered by a
nation's constitution.6 7 Both the European and American Conventions establish commissions to investigate allegations of
human rights abuses and advise its parent organization on human
rights issues.'6 "
Both the European and American Conventions operate on two
important premises: (1) that the essential human rights, the
rights to liberty, personal security, and equality before the law,
are not derived from an individual's nationality, but from the inregions
dividual himself; 6 9 and (2) that the law of these 7 two
0
rightsY.
human
of
protection
the
on
should be based
Because of the similarities between the two conventions, a discussion of the provisions of the European Convention identifies
the important aspects of both agreements. The European Convention states that "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to
that
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,"' 7'
'7 2
"[e]veryone has the right to liberty and security of person,'

164. Id. art. 4.
165. Id. art. 5.
166. American Convention, supra note 159, art. 5(3), reprinted at 102.-

167. Id. art. 7(2), reprinted at 103.
168. Id. arts. 31-51, reprinted at 111-16; European Convention, supra note
157, arts. 19-37.
169. American Convention, supra note 159, preamble, reprinted at 101; Eu-

ropean Convention, supra note 157, art. 1.
170. American Convention, supra note 159, preamble, reprinted at 101; European Convention, supra note 157, preamble.
171. European Convention, supra note 157, art. 3. It has been said that what

is and what is not permissible under article 3 can only be determined by looking
at (1) how the treatment or punishment affects the individual, that is whether

the treatment is voluntary or not, or (2) the harmfulness of the punishment to a
prisoner's physical or mental health. J. FAWcETT, THE APPLICATION OF THE EuRoPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 35-37 (1969); see also F. CASTBERG, THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 8 (1974); McDougal, Human Rights in
the U.N., 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 603 (1964).
172. European Convention, supra note 157, art. 5(1).
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and that no person can be deprived of the right to liberty unless
convicted (presumably of a criminal offense).17 3 The one provision
on immigration matters suggests only a limited authority to de174
tain aliens.
The European Convention also prohibits "torture or. . .inhuman or degrading treatment"'7 5 and defines inhuman treatment
as "the deliberate infliction of physical or mental pain or suffering."'176 The prohibition of degrading treatment was designed to
prevent all forms of cruel treatment or punishment. The difficulty
with article 3 is determining what is "inhuman" or "degrading."
Indeterminate sentencing, isolation detention, prohibition of access to the press, prohibitions of communication between aliens
detained in different institutions, and censorship of mail, arguably, are all considered inhuman or degrading within article 3. In
the context of criminal punishments, these practices would be allowed under the Conventions if they served the legitimate end of
preserving order in a penal institution. Whether a particular practice violates the Conventions depends upon the effect that the
practice has on an individual. The greater the harm a practice
causes the individual, the more likely it is that the practice violates the Conventions.
The European Convention drafters intended article 5 to preserve the important individual rights of liberty and personal security. The use of detention or incarceration was contemplated by
the drafters in the context of criminal punishment. Article 5(f) is
useful in assessing the question of exclusion and deportation. It
provides one of the permissible exceptions to the prohibition of
arrest and detention and allows a person "against whom action is

173. Id. art. 5(1)(a).
174. Id. art. 5(1)(f). It authorizes "the lawful arrest or detention of a person
to prevent his effecting an unauthorized entry into the country or of a person
against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition"
(emphasis added). Article 5(4) provides that "[e]veryone who is deprived of his
liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the
lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release
ordered if the detention is not lawful." Id. art. 5(4).
175. Id. art. 3. The inclusion of the word "or" is intended to broaden the
protections available to individuals because "torture" alone was considered to be
too narrow a proscription. See generally J. FAwcmr,supra note 171, at 34-41.
176. J. FAWCETT, supra note 171, at 35. Interpretations of article 3 have referred to United States Supreme Court rulings on the Eighth Amendment. Id. at
35 n.4 (citing Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resureber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947)).
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being taken with a view to deportation or extradition" to be detained. 177 The Convention, therefore, permits the legitimate denial of a fundamental liberty interest to individuals accused of
criminal acts or to individuals who are unable to care for themselves. Under the Convention, a fundamental interest deprivation
may occur in the fulfillment of a legal obligation or in the implementation of deportation.
An essential element of the right to be free is the ability to
challenge a detention before a court that is competent to review
the legality of the detention.17 8 Prior interpretations of the
United States immigration statute have not recognized this right.
United States courts have ruled that, because exclusion is a plenary power outside their jurisdiction, the courts are without authority to review the underlying legality of the detention of
aliens. 7 9 Consequently, detained persons find it difficult to chal177. European Convention, supra note 157, art. 5(l)(f).

178. See id. art. 5(4); see also F.

CASTBERG, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON

103-04 (1974). The Restatement provides the same language as
the European and American Conventions. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) FOREIGN
RELATIONS § 179(2)(b) (1965). While it is not entirely clear what is meant by
"competent," an argument can be made that the limited scope of review under
the United States law is not sufficient.
179. Under United States law the question of the legality of indefinite detention has not been squarely addressed. With only one exception, indefinite detention cases have turned on the issue of whether there had been an "abuse of
discretion" in the context of the parole decision. See Soroa-Gonzales v. Civiletti,
515 F. Supp. 1049, 1054-56 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 567 F.
Supp. 1115 (N.D. Ga. 1983), rev'd 734 F.2d 576 (11th Cir. 1984); but see Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981). Judicial review
under the abuse of discretion standard is extremely limited as the courts have
taken into account the "plenary" nature of the exclusion power. FernandezRoque, 734 F.2d at 583; Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204, 212 (2d Cir. 1982). A
clearer enunciation under the parole power and the extent to which aliens can
be invidiously discriminated against in the denial or granting of parole was addressed in Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 976 (11th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted
to 11th Cir. 105 S.Ct. 563 (1984).
Although a strong argument can be made that the present form of review is
insufficient, a court's ability to review abuse of discretion in the denial of parole
could be argued as being "competent" review. A more balanced approach would
recognize a more comprehensive review than one limited to abuse of discretion
in the parole decision while avoiding the illegality or legality of indefinite detention. The limitations of judicial review under United States law, if continued,
subject the Cubans to constantly facing the possibility of renewed detention.
Notwithstanding the arguments under international law, the indefinite detention question was squarely addressed only by the Rodriguez-Fernandez court,
HUMAN RIGHTS
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lenge the underlying legality of detention in the courts. The judicial interpretations, however, appear to conflict directly with the
preceding international treaties. The effect of this narrow view is
that even when a detained person has a right to freedom, a questionable assumption in itself, that right may not be successfully
asserted before a United States court.
A German court, however, has specifically prohibited the prolonged detention of an alien following the issuance of an order of
deportation.18 0 In reviewing a request for release from detention
by a Yugoslavian whose native country and all other countries refused to accept him, the German court stated that
a longer period of detention would offend against the Convention
on Human Rights, and in particular the principles laid down in
Article 5; for it would be out of proportionto the intended objective, and would, by becoming in effect of indefinite duration, lose
its character of a provisional measure .... 'll
One writer has interpreted the decision to mean that "[d]etention
that is unduly prolonged may. . . lose the character of being detention with a view to. . . deportation," and may, therefore, violate article 5.182 The German court's interpretation of article 5 is
consistent with the argument that detention with no realistic anticipation of deportation goes beyond a nation's immigration
power. The German court's interpretation of international law is
logical and consistent with a reasonable interpretation of a nation's permissible immigration authority and merits consideration
by United States courts.
Although the United States has not signed all the preceding international conventions, it still may be responsible for violations
of the conventions under international law.""' The widespread acwhich decided the case under United States domestic law.

180. Judgment of Mar. 10, 1965, Amstgericht, K6In, cited in J. FAwcErr,
supra note 171, at 117 n.1.
181. Id., translatedat J. FAwcETT 116-17.
182. J. FAwcETT,.supra note 171.
183. Unless Congress has statutorily called for the direct violation of a rule
of customary international law, a construction that violates that rule will be
avoided. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); see also Filartiga v.

Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 2930 (8th ed. 1955); G. FINCH, THE SOURCES OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW 44-58
(1937); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS § 3 reporters' note 2 (1965);

Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United

States (pts. 1-2), 101 U. PA. L. REV. 26, 792 (1952-1953).
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ceptance of the conventions' standards in the international community establishes minimum requirements to which all nations
should conform. The basic concept that customary international
law binds the United States Government is not new to United
States courts. The Tenth Circuit, for example, based its decision
to release Cuban refugees from detention on international law
18 4
principles.

A court facing a question that involves the applicability of international law must resolve the threshold issue of whether domestic law provides a clear directive on the particular question. If
domestic law clearly applies, then it is unnecessary to consider
international law. A court generally will not interpret a statute so
that the interpretation violates a principle of international law,
unless a clear congressional mandate supports the interpretation.
This Article previously established that although Congress has
clearly defined which persons should be denied entry into the
United States in the exclusion statutes, Congress did not include
provisions for the treatment of an excluded alien whom no other
nation will accept.185 Although the Fourth Circuit has interpreted
Congress' silence as allowing the Executive to detain excluded
aliens indefinitely, s6 the inadequacy of the approach merely highlights the importance of a search in international law for an equitable solution to the excluded alien's dilemma.
From an examination of international law, it is shown that treaties, conventions, protocols, and writings of scholars delineate certain fundamental rights that flow, not from legal entry into a nation, but from one's existence as an individual. Treaties that
provide specific rules on the issue include United Nations documents and regional agreements. In general, these agreements p~rovide individuals with (1) the right to be free from detention ex184. See Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1388 (10th Cir.
1981). Other courts have dealt with the rights of the detained Cubans but have
avoided basing their decisions on international law. See, e.g., Soroa-Gonzales v.
Civiletti, 515 F. Supp. 1049 (N.D. Ga. 1981). In Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 567
F. Supp. 1115, (S.D. Ga. 1983), rev'd, 743 F.2d 576 (11th Cir. 1984), the court
determined "that the rights accorded petitioners under international law are no
greater than those provided under our own Constitution." Id. at 1122 n.2. See
also Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787-95 (D. Kan. 1980).
185. See supra notes 94-96.
186. Palma v. Verdeyen, 676 F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1982). For a discussion
of the role of the executive and legislative authority over immigration, see 1 C.
GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 23 §§ 1.5a, 1.5b, 2.2.
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cept when the individual is faced with criminal charges, is unable
to care for herself, or is in the process of deportation; (2) the right
187
to be treated as a national under the law of the host country;
and (3) the right, upon detention, to be treated humanely and not
degraded or tortured. An examination of the international agreements provides a basis for the conclusion that rights of the individual are protected under international law. The drafters of the
RESTATEMENT (REvISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, for example,
considered that the United Nations Charter would be adhered to
by all states including nonmembers18 8 Scholars, however, disagree over whether the United Nations Charter has hardened into
customary international law. 189 The view that the provisions of
multilateral agreements will form rules of customary international
law also will not be without detractors. Whether the treaties will
immediately generate customary international law is also a matter
of disagreement among scholars. 90 Although these treaties do not
create rights that an alien may successfully assert in litigating affirmative claims before United States courts, the treaties can assist in the determination of whether indefinite detention is permissible. After reviewing these agreements, one can only conclude
that the indefinite detention of an alien who is without the right
to effective judicial review is a violation of the accepted standards
187. The Convention on Aliens, Feb. 20, 1928, 46 Stat. 2753, T.S. No. 815,
132 L.N.T.S. 301, of which the United States is a party, requires foreigners to be

treated with the same guarantees of "essential civil rights" enjoyed by nationals.
Id. art. 5. The Restatement recognizes this requirement of equal treatment: "It
has recently been suggested that states are bound by international law to respect
certain basic human rights of all persons, whether aliens or nationals, and that
responsibility for injuries to aliens is merely one aspect of such a general responsibility." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 165 comment b
(1965).
188. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 comment h
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 1980).

189. See Panel Discussibn, Contemporary Views on the Sources of International Law: The Effect of the U.N. Resolutions on Emerging Legal Norms, 73
AM. J. INT'L PROC. 300 (1979); 1 L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 518 (1973). With respect to the obligations of the
member states of the O.A.S., see T. BUERGENTHAL, R. NORRIS, D. SHELTON, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS: SELECTED PROBLEMS 26-35 (1982).
190. See Baxter, Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary International Law, 41 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 275 (1965-1966); D'Amato, Manifest Intent

and the Generationby Treaty of Customary Rules of InternationalLaw, 64 AM.
J. INT'L L. 892 (1970).
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of international law.191
It is not an exaggeration to say that the United States has violated each of the fundamental principles in its dealings with the
Cuban refugees. The Cubans have been treated with less respect
than the criminals who are protected under the European and
American Conventions and our criminal statutes. The United
States courts have completely ignored the effects of prolonged detention on the individual aliens and the devastating effects of detention in mental institutions on aliens who are not mentally incapacitated. Irrespective of whether excluded aliens are entitled
to constitutional protections, they are entitled to the humane
treatment required by the basic standards of international law.
Furthermore, detention of the aliens should extend for a fixed
time, and then only upon a clear showing of a potential danger to
society.
An individual's conviction for a criminal offense is the critical
factor that generally allows a state to punish the individual. The
normal form of punishment for criminal acts in the United States
is deprivation of liberty. An alleged criminal is deprived of his
liberty only after the process of carefully determining the facts in
a trial that has resulted in a conviction. Excluded aliens in indefinite detention have none of these rights because, as the argument
goes, constitutional protections do not apply to aliens in exclusion.19 2 The more persuasive and logical reasoning proposes that
certain basic and fundamental rights, enunciated in numerous international documents as well as in the Declaration of Independence, prevent reprehensible governmental actions. A contrary
finding would literally mean that no domestic or international legal restraints can prevent Congress or the Executive from ordering the execution of Cuban refugees in response to the current
alien dilemma.
191. For a discussion of the enforcement of international human rights in
domestic courts, see Burke, Coliver, de la Vega & Rosenbaum, Application of
InternationalHuman Rights in State and Federal Courts, 18 TEX. INT'L L.J.
291 (1983); Lillich, The Role of Domestic Courts in Enforcing International
Human Rights Law, 74 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PROC. 20-25 (1980).
192. The Government has also argued that these Cubans can be detained
because they are excludable. Almost every Cuban, whether in or out of detention, however, is inadmissible to the United States. As noted earlier, the primary
difference between detained and nondetained Cubans is that in the latter case
the INS has not yet learned that the sponsor/alien relation has broken down.
See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
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VII.

CRITIQUE

A. Overview
Traditionally, legal questions have been resolved by first balancing the interests and rights of opposing parties and then attempting to reach a logical solution based on the balancing conclusions. The Supreme Court has decided that aliens in exclusion
have no rights other than those provided in the immigration statutes. The immigration statutes, although clearly providing methods to effect the speedy exclusion of excluded aliens, provides no
guidance on the proper procedure for processing excluded aliens
when no other country will accept them.
This Article has attempted to focus on the limits of the power
to exclude, the Executive's misuse of the parole authority, and
the rights of excluded aliens under international law. Customary
international law supports the interpretation that indefinite detention is not a proper exercise of a nation's immigration authority. International law places a premium on the propositions that
an individual's right to liberty arises independently of any national affiliation and that one's liberty cannot be restrained simply because one commits the nonpenal act of attempting to enter
the United States. The exclusion power, although extensive, is
not without limitations imposed by the courts. Supreme Court
decisions in exclusion cases have always qualified the power to
exclude; the Court has never stated that Congress had unlimited
authority to deal with aliens.
The Executive has misapplied the parole authority and has totally ignored the statutorily designed mechanism for the admission of refugees. The Executive's abuse of parole authority raises
the question whether Cuban refugees should be considered to
have legally entered the United States and thus, to have been accorded "constitutional-like" protections.1 9 3
The Judiciary's hesitancy to interfere in immigration matters
has reached an extreme that allows Congress to establish when
aliens may assert constitutional rights. The dangerous consequences of the unfettered exercise of immigration power are easily imaginable. Surely, the Supreme Court would not sanction enactment of a statute in which Congress equates legal entry in the
United States with obtaining citizenship and thereby limits the
rights of all aliens to only those Congress sees fit to afford aliens.
193.

See supra notes 118-19.
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Nevertheless, the end result of such a statute would be no different than the Executive's use of parole to prevent the assertion of
constitutional rights by aliens physically present in the United
States for more than five years. The Supreme Court must reexamine the doctrines of parole and entry and the doctrines' currently devastating and illogical effects on the vesting of individual
rights. The framework for such an analysis dictates further examination of the governmental authority to regulate immigration
and Congress' power to limit arbitrarily those rights basic to any
civilized nation's system of jurisprudence.
B. Proposed Solution
This Article has argued that an immigration policy of indefinite
detention ignores reality and offers, at best, dubious returns. The
Cuban refugees may never be allowed to return to Cuba or any
other country. Accordingly, their continued detention increases
both the difficulty of integrating the refugees into society and the
already tremendously high cost to the Government.
The most logical solution to the Cuban refugee dilemma requires a pragmatic approach to the problem, which examines the
reasons for the continued detention of refugees. First, the major
impediment to the release of the detained Cuban refugees is the
unavailability of sponsors. To alleviate the relative paucity of
sponsors, the Government could simply set up its own halfway
houses or use existing criminal probation programs to sponsor the
Cubans for parole. Second, the detention facilities for Cuban refugees with alleged psychological problems should be converted
into halfway houses. Third, many refugees are currently in detention because the Government believes that the refugees would
present a danger to society if released. These individuals should
be given an opportunity to show that they are not dangerous. The
common thread connecting the three proposed solutions is that
the Government, instead of volunteer organizations, should sponsor the Cuban refugees.
Additionally, Cuban refugees who truly suffer from psychological problems should be placed in regular mental institutions in
the United States. The crux of the problem, however, is determining which aliens are in need of treatment. Many of the refugees are not suffering from treatable psychological problems and
are a danger to neither themselves nor others. In fact their condition would not be sufficient to detain anyone but an alien in exclusion or parole. The continued detention of these people can
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only lead to the deterioration of their situation.
Any resolution of the question of what should be done with
aliens in exclusion who face indefinite detention requires a balancing of individual and national interests. Aliens desire not only
freedom but also, under some circumstances, support. The primary interest of the Government is the protection of the public at
large from real, not imagined, dangers.
If the alien in indefinite detention does not merit constitutional
protections, international law provides ample support for the recognition of a different category of human rights. Whether these
rights are fundamental rights implicit in the Constitution or are
rights derived from natural or international law does not matter.
What is important is the ample support that fundamental rights
lend to the proposition that every individual, regardless of his immigration status, is entitled to freedom unless previously convicted of a crime or otherwise shown to present a danger to society. A corollary of this basic human right is the right to be
released from detention after a reasonable period of time pending
deportation or exclusion. A recognition of this right does not restrict a government's power to exclude aliens.
The proposals made here do not ignore the "behavioral"
problems and criminal acts exhibited by some of the detained
Cubans. The refugees who have committed crimes in the United
States should be punished for those crimes. Similarly, persons
who present dangers to themselves or others should be civilly
committed for their own protection and that of others.
To date, the standards used to determine whether a Cuban refugee in detention is dangerous have been based on the precept
that the Cuban refugee has absolutely no rights. These people enjoy fewer recognized rights than common criminals and wartime
combatants and noncombatants. The United States Government
must realize that the detained Cubans are not criminals. The
Government must establish a review plan for all refugees presently detained that circumvents the inadequacies of the plan proposed in Fernandez-Roque v. Smith.9
Finally, the Cuban refugees currently in detention are learning
no useful skills, but merely drain the public fisc. Each day spent
languishing in detention makes their eventual successful adjust194. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. The Cuban refugee who
perceives herself as having committed no wrong can be expected to express only
outrage with any ineffective review plan.
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ment to society more difficult. Acts of desperation and frustration, including violence and suicide in detention facilities, may
eventually exceed those acts similarly occurring in the average penal correction institution. A Cuban refugee can only be expected
to strive to meet the requirements for release if the possibility for
release exists. When a Cuban refugee realizes that release from
detention is impossible, however, commission of desperate and
destructive acts of violence and suicide become more likely because the Cuban refugee views these acts as the only means of
expressing her dissatisfaction with indefinite detention.
The issue of whether a government has the power to indefinitely detain an alien is immensely important irrespective of the
outcome in individual deportation efforts. Indefinite or long term
detention has an enormous impact on the law as well as on the
person subjected to languishing in a jail or mental facility through
no fault of his own. Certainly, the United States' unquestioned
use of this type of detention in the case of the Cuban refugees
who came to this country in the Freedom Flotilla may be repeated in the future as a "legitimate" exercise of the exclusion
and parole powers. It cannot be said that the detention is no
longer indefinite merely because an agreement has been reached
to return some Cuban refugees to Cuba. Regardless of the numbers of persons who are eventually returned to Cuba under the
agreement, many Cubans will remain in this country. It is unclear
whether those in detention will remain confined or if they will
eventually be released. Their eventual release, notwithstanding
the issue on whether an alien can be confined for such extensive
periods, remains an issue which must be addressed.
Even though an agreement has been reached, it is impossible to
determine who among these individuals will remain in indefinite
detention. First, a Cuban who is on the list has no way of knowing
whether or not he will be deported. Second, the agreement limits
the deportations to not more than 100 persons in any given
1

month.
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When this is viewed with the threat of protracted litigation it is
probable that Cuba could change its position on the agreement
before all the Cubans on the list could be deported. As the Government stated, "[g]iven the unpredictability of world events, and
the possibility that Cuba could renege on the agreement at any
195. The number of Cuban refugees on the list exceeds 2700. The process of
deporting the Cubans, therefore, could take more than two years.
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time, it is essential that the United States begin implementation
now. ' 196 As Mr. Justice Rehnquist noted in Garcia-Mir v.
Smith, 97 there are approximately 1500 persons who have yet to
exhaust their administrative remedies or at best, the INS will
possibly be faced with as many individual claims which could disrupt subsequently the entire deportation process.
Now that the United States has reached this agreement with
Cuba, the question of individuals' claims of indefinite detention
are, if not extinguished, then certainly changed in character. A
strong argument can be made that, at least for individuals on the
list to be returned to Cuba, detention is pursuant to deportation
efforts even though it is not known when that might occur. With
respect to the other Cubans not on the list, their detention continues to be indefinite.
Finally, one cannot assume that the remaining 120,000 or more
Cubans who present themselves for adjustment to lawful permanent resident status will not be found ineligible and further detained. The legal question will arise once more of whether or not
the government has the power to indefinitely detain an alien simply because she is in "exclusion" or has lost her "parole" status.

196. Memorandum in Support of Government's Motion for a Stay of the
District Court's October 15, 1984 Order Pending Appeal at 2, Jan., 1985 (11th
Cir. 84-8993).
197. 105 S. Ct. 948 (1985).
* "I am grateful to my family, friends and colleagues who gave me the encour-

agement and support, without which I could not have completed this article."

